In der jüngeren Sozialisationstheorie wird vermehrt die Intention formuliert, die Eigenaktivität des Subjektes im Sozialisationsprozess stärker zu berücksichtigen. Zum einen wird dies mit der Formel des ‘produktiv realitätsverarbeitenden Subjektes’ auf den Begriff gebracht, zum anderen bemüht sich insbesondere die kompetenzorientierte ‘konstruktivistische Sozialisationsforschung’ dieses Programm zu verfolgen. Dabei wird jedoch ein handlungstheoretisches Subjektverständnis bemüht, das eine begriffliche Unschärfe produziert, die eine konsistente Subjekttheorie und damit eine trennscharfe Bestimmung der Eigenaktivität des Subjektes erschwert. Um dieses Problem zu lösen, wird in dem Beitrag der Vorschlag gemacht, das Subjekt erkennt-nistheoretisch bzw. -kritisch zu konzipieren. Dadurch wird ein Subjektverständnis instruiert, das die Subjekt-Objekt-Dichotomie überwindet und die Wirklichkeit als je subjektives Konstrukt begreift Der Vorteil dieses zunächst heuristischen Vorschlages liegt einerseits in der Möglichkeit einer konsistenten Subjektbestimmung und andererseits in einer forschungsanleitenden Programmatik, die einen breiteren Zugang zu individuellen Entwicklungsverläufen ermöglicht. – English: From the “individual as a productive processor of reality” to the “individual as a productive producer of reality”. A philosophical foundation of theory of socialization. In recent theory of socialisation there is an increasing awareness giving more attention to the agency of subjects itself in the process of socialization. Direct indications about that change into the focus of theory of socialization are the often used formula of the “ individual as a productive processor of reality” or the programme of the constructivist research of socialization. In both cases still many problems are produced first of all through the idea of an action-theory based subject. One of the main theses in this article is that this understanding aggravates a consistent theory of subject in theories of socialization and so an unequivocal definition of agency of subjects. To solve that problems 1 suggest to conceptualise the subject epistemologically. The consequence of this strategy will offer a comprehension of the subject that is able to overcome the subject-object-dichotomy and to recognize “reality” as a construct made by subjects in a strict sense. On the one hand the advantage of this firstly heuristic proposal is the possibility to ascertain consistently the subject. On the other hand further research may be fruitful instructed because of the broader understanding of individual development. ||
Notions of embodiment, situatedness, and dynamics are increasingly being debated in cognitive sci ence. However, these debates are often carried out in the absence of concrete examples. In order to build intuition, this paper explores a model agent to illustrate how the perspective and tools of dynam ical systems theory can be applied to the analysis of situated, embodied agents capable of minimally cognitive behavior. Specifically, we study a model agent whose “nervous system” was evolved using a genetic algorithm to catch circular objects and to avoid diamond-shaped ones. After characterizing the performance, behavioral strategy and psychophysics of the best-evolved agent, its dynamics are analyzed in some detail at three different levels: (1) the entire coupled brain/body/environment sys tem; (2) the interaction between agent and environment that generates the observed coupled dynam ics; (3) the underlying neuronal properties responsible for the agent dynamics. This analysis offers both explanatory insight and testable predictions. The paper concludes with discussions of the overall picture that emerges from this analysis, the challenges this picture poses to traditional notions of rep resentation, and the utility of a research methodology involving the analysis of simpler idealized mod els of complete brain/body/environment systems.
Maturana and Varela’s notion of autopoiesis has the potential to transform the conceptual foundation of biology as well as the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences. In order to fully realize this potential, however, the concept of autopoiesis and its many consequences require significant further theoretical and empirical development. A crucial step in this direction is the formulation and analysis of models of autopoietic systems. This article sketches the beginnings of such a project by examining a glider from Conway’s game of life in autopoietic terms. Such analyses can clarify some of the key ideas underlying autopoiesis and draw attention to some of the central open issues. This article also examines the relationship between an autopoietic perspective on cognition and recent work on dynamical approaches to the behavior and cognition of situated, embodied agents. Relevance: The article focuses on the theory of autopoiesis and related concepts such as structural coupling and cognitive domain.
Maturana and Varela’s concept of autopoiesis defines the essential organization of living systems and serves as a foundation for their biology of cognition and the enactive approach to cognitive science. As an initial step toward a more formal analysis of autopoiesis, this paper investigates its application to the compact, recurrent spatiotemporal patterns that arise in Conway’s Game of Life cellular automata. In particular, we demonstrate how such entities can be formulated as self-constructing networks of interdependent processes that maintain their own boundaries. We then characterize the specific organizations of several such entities, suggest a way to simplify the descriptions of these organizations, and briefly consider the transformation of such organizations over time. Relevance: The paper presents an analysis of a minimal concrete model of autopoiesis to provide a more rigorous foundation for the concept of autopoiesis and highlight its ambiguities and difficulties.