Approach «Neurophenomenology»

Neurophenomenology is a research program put forward by F. J. Varela 1996Varela F. J. (1996) Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy to the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3(4): 330–349. with the aim of addressing the so-called hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995), the problem of explaining why is it that (neuro)cognitive processes are accompanied by subjective or phenomenal experiences (qualia). Varela maintains that the hard problem of consciousness is not theoretical or metaphysical in nature, but needs to be tackled pragmatically, i.e. by devising “a rigorous method and an explicit pragmatics for its exploration and analysis” (Varela 1996Varela F. J. (1996) Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy to the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3(4): 330–349.: 330). To this end, the proposed research program seeks pragmatic ways of combining rigorous first-person (phenomenological) analyses (with special emphasis on methods developed by phenomenological movement and contemplative traditions) with cutting-edge neuroscientific accounts (with special emphasis on methods developed in the field of dynamical neuroscience). Varela construes the “working hypothesis of neurophenomenology” as follows: “Phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their counterparts in cognitive science relate to each other through reciprocal constraints” (Varela 1996Varela F. J. (1996) Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy to the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3(4): 330–349.: 343). Phenomenological and neuroscientific accounts are thus methodologically put on an equal footing, with the former guiding and shaping (“constraining”) the approaches taken by the latter, and vice versa.
Cite this definition as: Vörös S. (2016) Neurophenomenology. Constructivist E-Paper Archive. Version of 20 February 2016. Available at http://cepa.info/approach/neurophenomenology

Publications Found: 72 · Show All Abstracts

Baquedano C. & Fabar C. (2017) Modeling Subjects’ Experience While Modeling the Experimental Design: A Mild-Neurophenomenology-Inspired Approach in the Piloting Phase. Constructivist Foundations 12(2): 166–179. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/4070
Barinaga M. (2003) Buddhism and Neuroscience: Studying the Well-Trained Mind. Science 302: 44–46. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/2417
Bayne T. (2004) Closing the gap? Some questions for neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and cognitive sciences 3: 349–364. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/2260
Beaton M. (2013) Phenomenology and Embodied Action. Constructivist Foundations 8(3): 298-313. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/907
Beaton M., Pierce B. & Stuart S. (2013) Neurophenomenology – A Special Issue. Constructivist Foundations 8(3): 265–268. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/903
Bitbol M. (2002) Science as if situation mattered. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science 1: 181–224. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/4373
Bitbol M. (2003) A cure for metaphysical illusions: Kant, quantum mechanics, and the madhyamaka. In: Wallace B. A. (ed.) Buddhism and science. Columbia University Press: 325-361. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/2614
Bitbol M. (2008) Is consciousness primary? NeuroQuantoloy 6(1): 53–72. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/2261
Bitbol M. (2012) Neurophenomenology, an Ongoing Practice of/in Consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 7(3): 165–173. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/504
Bitbol M. & Petitmengin C. (2013) A Defense of Introspection from Within. Constructivist Foundations 8(3): 269–279. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/904
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