Show All Abstracts
» Help with Search
You can directly search for a reference by copy-pasting it, e.g.,
Glasersfeld E. von (1974) Jean Piaget and the radical constructivist epistemology
Unless a word (or phrase) if prefixed with a minus (-) it must be present in all results. Examples:
shows all publications Ernst von Glasersfeld and Francisco Varela wrote together.
Glasersfeld "Jean Piaget"
finds all publications with
to indicate that this word must not be present in any result:
will find entries that have
in the title but not
Enter the surname of an author and a year to find all publications the author wrote in that year:
presents all publications Ernst von Glasersfeld published in 1995.
to match any characters:
matches constructivism and constructivist.
Enclose phrases between double quotes
to force phrase search:
"biology of cognition"
lists only the publications containing this phrase.
All the searches above match author, titles and years. You can also address single fields:
shows publications von Glasersfeld wrote on reality;
searches all abstracts for "second-order";
finds all books edited by Watzlawick.
Note there is no space after the colon.
Attention: Words of three letters and less are ignored.
"Not one, not two"
will return no result although there is
of this title.
Are philosophers’ actions realist or
In: Kanzian C., Kletzl S., Mitterer J. & Neges K. (eds.)
Realism – relativism –
. De Gruyter, Berlin: 3–15.
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/4199
In my article, I propose to discuss
m and realism in terms of actions instead of doing that in a usual way, in terms of theories, philosophers or general positions. To enable this, I offer two conceptual tools. First, I use modified model of four types of knowledge introduced by Andrzej Zybertowicz. It approaches any knowledge-building process as a cultural game, and recognizes reproduction, discovery, redefinition, and design of a new game. Second, I use Stanislaw Lem’s model of three types of geniuses. I illustrate my approach briefly using examples from Plato, Spinoza and Berkeley.
m: Theories and practicalities.
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/3958
In the drive to improve standards, the collection and dissemination of numerical data still directs much contemporary educational policy. However, recent publications and debates seemingly attempt to reorient discussion from performance to learning. In support,
m is often referenced as a contributor in this endeavour. However,
m is not a single unified theory either of knowledge or pedagogy. This article identifies one version of
t thinking, social
m, both in terms of its underlying epistemology (theory of knowledge) and related pedagogy. Contemporary educational theories are then outlined to demonstrate that many practical solutions and theoretical ideas now presented as ‘good learning and teaching’ have much in common with social
t thinking. Finally, the article concludes by identifying two issues that require further discussion and debate if pedagogy of a social
t nature is to be considered.
Butter knives and screwdrivers: An intentionalist defense of radical
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/3849
Robert Stecker has posed a dilemma for the
t theory of interpretation: either interpretations consist of statements with truth values or they do not. Stecker argues that either way, they cannot change the meaning of an artwork. In this article, I argue contra Stecker that if interpretations consist of meaning declarations rather than statements, they can change the meanings of the objects toward which they are directed, where whether they so consist is largely a function of the interpreter’s intentions. Hence, the second horn of Stecker’s dilemma is defeated.
Anderson J. R.
Reder L. M.
Simon H. A.
m and cognitive psychology.
Brookings Papers on Education Policy
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/4127
Andrew A. M.
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/2628
A number of observations are made about the nature of
m, with the suggestion that it is a less revolutionary development that has been claimed, and that some accounts imply an unwarranted disregard of the environment. The presentation is meant to be provocative and to invite discussion that may clarify the issues.
Ideas for a phenomenological interpretation and elaboration of personal construct theory. Part 1. Kelly between
m and phenomenology.
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/1249
Kelly’s personal construct theory, put forward in 1955, is considered the first
t theory of personality and the first expression of those contemporary psychotherapeutic perspectives grounded on a
t view of knowledge. Notwithstanding the similarities between psychological
m and the phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition, Kelly always rejected the parallel of his theory to phenomenology, regarding the latter as unacceptable since idealistic, solipsistic, and particularistic. In this first article of a work subdivided into three parts, the Authors explain such criticism by Kelly with his knowledge of phenomenology deriving from secondary sources, and stress the wide possibilities of a phenomenological interpretation and elaboration of his theory.
The publication highlights the analogy between psychological
m and phenomenology.
Avenier M. J.
t view of organizational design science.
Organization Studies, Special Issue “Organization studies as applied science: the generation and use of academic knowledge about organizations”
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/371
The so-called rigor–relevance gap appears unbridgeable in the classical view of organization science, which is based on the physical sciences’ model.
t scholars have also pointed out a certain inadequacy of this model of science for organization research, but they have not offered an explicit, alternative model of science. Responding to this lack, this paper brings together the two separate paradigmatic perspectives of
t epistemologies and of organizational design science, and shows how they could jointly constitute the ingredients of a
m-founded scientific paradigm for organization research. Further, the paper highlights that, in this
t view of organizational design science, knowledge can be generated and used in ways that are mutually enriching for academia and practice
m contested: Implications of a genetic perspective in psychology.
Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science
m is an approach to knowledge and learning that focuses on the active role of knowers. Sanchez and Loredo propose a classification of
t thinkers and address what they perceive to be internal problems of present-day
m. The remedy they propose is a return to the genetic
m of James Mark Baldwin, Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky. In this article we first raise the question of whether thinkers like Baldwin, Vygotsky, Maturana and Varela are adequately depicted as
ts, and subsequently argue that
m is caught in an overly epistemic version of the subject/object dichotomy. We then introduce a genetic logic that is not based on the Hegelian dialectics of negation and mediation, but rather on the idea of the recursive consensual coordination of actions that give rise to stylized cultural practices. We argue that a genuinely genetic and generative psychology should be concerned with the multifarious and ever-changing nature of human “life” and not merely with the construction of knowledge about life.
The article deals with perceived “internal” problems of
t approaches and proposes a genetic and generative psychology that is centrally concerned with human life-as-lived and not merely with life-as-known. The article furthermore raises the question whether key thinkers like Vygotsky, Maturana and Varela and are adequately depicted as
On Making Process Practically Visible, or Moving
m Beyond Philosophical Argumentation.
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/235
Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical
m” by Siegfried J. Schmidt.
Schmidt’s “philosophical argumentation” in favor of an action orientation for communication rewrites
m in terms of process. Though in support of his proposal, a philosophical argumentation about process works best for illuminating the writer’s own process and orienting readers to his own argument. I propose that arguments about the communication of social actors should make visible the social processes about which they argue.
Barton A. C.
Osborne M. D.
Re-examining lived experiences: Radical
m and gender.
Cybernetics & Human Knowing
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/3122
m grows out of the belief that knowledge is constructed and legitimated by individuals as they make sense of their experiences in particular contexts and drawing on their own histories. Extending this understanding of learning and ways of knowing to girls as they work in the terrain of science, we argue that honoring student experience as the starting place for science instruction fundamentally alters the nature of science, the purpose of teaching and learning science, and the focus of relationships in science class. The implications for this position are extensive: they suggest that the dynamic relationships between language and cultural background of students and teachers alter the ways in which science education historically has enacted discipline, curriculum and pedagogy. We argue that this is particularly important to understand, for science and science education have historically operated within the masculine domain and working with girls in science in ways that respect their (gendered and cultural) construction of knowledge and their experiences, fundamentally alters the enterprise of science – an idea contradictory to most visions of the purposes of education and current reform efforts in science education, even the most liberal.
Export result page as:
Please provide us with your