Borrett D., Kelly S. & Kwan H. (2000) Phenomenology, dynamical neural networks and brain function. Philosophical Psychology 13(2): 213–228. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/4008
Phenomenology, dynamical neural networks and brain function.
Philosophical Psychology 13(2): 213–228.
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/4008
Current cognitive science models of perception and action assume that the objects that we move toward and perceive are represented as determinate in our experience of them. A proper phenomenology of perception and action, however, shows that we experience objects indeterminately when we are perceiving them or moving toward them. This indeterminacy, as it relates to simple movement and perception, is captured in the proposed phenomenologically based recurrent network models of brain function. These models provide a possible foundation from which predicative structures may arise as an emergent phenomenon without the positing of a representing subject. These models go some way in addressing the dual constraints of phenomenological accuracy and neurophysiological plausibility that ought to guide all projects devoted to discovering the physical basis of human experience.