Constructivist Foundations (CF) is an international peer-reviewed academic e-journal listed in the AHCI. It is dedicated to constructivist issues raised by philosophy as well as the natural, human, and applied sciences. The journal publishes original scholarly work in all areas of constructivist approaches, especially radical constructivism, enaction and enactive cognitive science, second order cybernetics, biology of cognition and the theory of autopoietic systems, non-dualizing philosophy, and first-person research, among others. The readers of the journal will be kept up-to-date with the central issues of the Constructivist Community.
Submissions of papers that correspond to the Aims and Scope of the journal are always welcome. Occasionally the journal publishes special issues focusing on a specific topic. Special issues currently in production or planning are: Neurophenomenology, Second-order Science, Computational Constructivism (CFP, Deadline for submissions: 1 June 2013). Forty Years of Radical Constructivism in Educational Research (CFP, Deadline: 31 January 2014).
Constructivist Foundations appears three times a year and is available for free to its subscribers. Papers are published in an attractive format ready to be printed by the reader. Their physical appearance is permanently fixed (“permanent links”) to allow for reliable citations in terms of volume, number, and page.
Constructivist Foundations is listed in Thomson Reuters’s Science Citation Index (Arts & Humanities Citation Index and the Current Contents/Arts & Humanities) • in European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH), Philosophy • The Philosopher’s Index • PhilPapers • Scopus • Google Scholar • EBSCO’s Education Research Complete. ISSN: 1782-348X.
Aims and Scope
Constructivist approaches support the idea that mental structures such as cognition and perception are actively built by one’s mind rather than passively acquired. However, constructivist approaches vary in function of how much influence they attribute to constructions.
Many assume a dualistic relationship between reality and constructed elements. They maintain that constructed mental structures gradually adapt to the structures of the real world (e.g., Piaget). In this view perception is the pickup of information controlled by the mental structure that is constructed from earlier perceptions (e.g., Neisser). This leads to the claim that mental structures are about learning sensorimotor contingencies (e.g., O’Regan).
Others seek to avoid the dualistic position. Either they skeptically reject that the structures of the real world can be compared with mental ones, independently of the senses through which the mental structures were constructed in the first place (e.g., von Glasersfeld), or they embrace a phenomenological perspective that considers perception as the grouping of experiential complexes (e.g., Mach).
All these approaches emphasize the primacy of the cognitive system (e.g., Llinás) and its organizational closure (e.g., von Foerster, Maturana). Hence, perceived patterns and regularities may be regarded as invariants of inborn cognitive operators (e.g., Diettrich).
Constructivist approaches can be said to differ also with respect to whether constructs are considered to populate the rational-linguistic (e.g., von Glasersfeld, Schmidt) or the biological-bodily (“enactivist/embodied” theories, e.g., Varela).