Volume 10 · Number 3 · Pages 422–425

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Specifying Revolutionary Sense-Making. Review of Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making: Making Sense of Non-Sense edited by Tom Froese and Massimiliano Cappuccio

Patrick Hoburg

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Abstract

Upshot: This eclectic collection of essays attempts to make sense of the complexly vexed relation between various modalities of sense-making and non-sense – a relation previously underspecified by enactivist theories and programs of research. As such, the book offers creative conceptual elaboration often augmented by analysis of experimental research in support of the enactivist approach to cognition.

Citation

Hoburg P. (2015) Specifying revolutionary sense-making. Review of enactive cognition at the edge of sense-making: Making sense of non-sense edited by tom froese and massimiliano cappuccio. Constructivist Foundations 10(3): 422–425. http://constructivist.info/10/3/422

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References

Dennett D. (1993) Review of The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. American Journal of Psychology 106(1): 121–126. Available at http://cogprints.org/273/1/varela.htm

Froese T. (2011) From adaptive behaviour to human cognition: A review of Enaction. Adaptive Behavior 20(3): 209–221. << Google Scholar

McGee K. (2005) Enactive cognitive science. Part 1: Background and research themes. Constructivist Foundations 1(1): 19–34. Available at http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/1/1/019.mcgee

McGee K. (2006) Enactive cognitive science. Part 2: Methods, insights, and potential. Constructivist Foundations 1(2): 73–82. Available at http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/1/2/073.mcgee

Varela F. J., Thompson E. & Rosch E. (1991) The embodied mind. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. << Google Scholar

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