Volume 3 · Number 3 · Pages 148–152

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Action and Discourse. Some Thoughts Concerning a Non-dualizing Conception of Experience

Franz Ofner

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Abstract

Purpose: The paper aims at examining whether George Herbert Mead’s theory of language is an appropriate candidate for developing a non-dualistic conception of experience and empirical research. Problem: Josef Mitterer has limited his theory of a non-dualizing way of speaking to criticizing dualistic positions in philosophy and sciences but has not developed a non-dualistic conception of empirical research. To do this, the task is to forego the notion “description” as a remainder category of dualism to develop a new understanding of language. Findings: Mead’s communication and action theory contains a non-dualistic nucleus. His gesture theory of communication allows us to distinguish action and speech and connect them in a non-dualizing way. Further research should especially focus on the relation between immediate and reflective experience in Mead’s work.

Key words: non-dualism, communication theory, experience theory

Citation

Ofner F. (2008) Action and Discourse. Some Thoughts Concerning a Non-dualizing Conception of Experience. Constructivist Foundations 3(3): 148–152. Available at http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/3/3/148.ofner

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