Volume 6 · Number 2 · Pages 270–274

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Is the “Core Self” a Construct? Review of “Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective” by Dan Zahavi

Claire Petitmengin

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Abstract

Upshot: Is lived experience always the experience of a self? The central thesis of Dan Zahavi’s book is that there is a “minimal” or “core” self, according to which a quality of “self-givenness” is a constitutive feature of experience. The adoption of a dynamic phenomenological perspective leads us to call this thesis into question.

Citation

Petitmengin C. (2011) Is the “Core Self” a Construct? Review of “Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective” by Dan Zahavi. Constructivist Foundations 6(2): 270–274. Available at http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/6/2/270.petitmengin

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