AbstractUpshot: According to its introduction, the aim of Enaction is to “present the paradigm of enaction as a framework for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science as a whole.” While many of the chapters make progress towards this aim, the book as a whole does not present enactivism as a coherent framework, and it could be argued that enactivism’s embrace of phenomenology means it is no longer a theory of cognition. ReferenceReid D. A. (2011) Enaction: An Incomplete Paradigm for Consciousness Science. Review of “Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science” edited by John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo. Constructivist Foundations 7(1): 81–83. Available at http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/7/1/081.reid Permalink: http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/7/1/081.reid Article citation data: Plain Text · BibTex · EndNote · Reference Manager (RIS) | ||