Elke Brendel is a Professor of Philosophy and Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Bonn, Germany.
She has published numerous books and articles on topics in logic, epistemology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and meta-philosophy.
She has worked on logical and semantic paradoxes, theories of truth and knowledge, epistemic contextualism and relativism,
and on semantic and epistemic aspects of disagreement. Her main research interests also include the study of philosophical and scientific thought experiments.
In particular, she has worked on the logical structure of thought experiments and on the question of how to rationally assess the success and failure
of thought experiments.
James Robert Brown
James Robert Brown is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto.
His interests include a wide range of topics in the philosophy of science and mathematics:
thought experiments, foundational issues in mathematics and physics, visual reasoning,
and issues involving science and society, such as the role of commercialization in medical research.
His books include: The Rational and the Social (Routledge 1989), The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Science
(Routledge 1991/2010), Smoke and Mirrors: How Science Reflects Reality (Routledge 1994), Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures
(Routledge 1999/2008), Who Rules in Science: A Guide to the Wars (Harvard 2001), Platonism, Naturalism and Mathematical Knowledge (Routledge 2012),
and most recently, he co-edited (with Stuart and Fehige) The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. He has been elected to the Royal Society of Canada,
the German Academy of Sciences (Leopoldina), and L'Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences.
In the face of all evidence to the contrary, he advocates a Platonic account of thought experiments.
John D. Norton
John D. Norton is Distinguished Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh.
He is a past Chair of his department and a past Director of the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh.
He has worked extensively in the history of relativity theory and gave the first analysis of Einstein's "Zurich Notebook," in which Einstein preserved
the private calculations that led him to general relativity. He has also worked on general topics in philosophy of space and time,
including the "hole argument" against spacetime substantialism. He has mounted an extended historical and philosophical rebuttal of the present
consensus that there are deep connections between the abstract notion of information and the physical quantity of thermodynamic entropy.
In general philosophy of science, he defends a "material theory of induction" according to which there are no universal rules of inductive inference.
Rather, inductive inferences are warranted locally by facts in the pertinent domain. In the face of all evidence to the contrary,
he has elaborated and defended a view of thought experiments as merely picturesque argumentation.
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