Round Table:
THE EARLY AND MIDDLE BYZANTINE TRADITION OF ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC: THE ROAD FROM ALEXANDRIA TO CONSTANTINOPLE
Convener: Christophe Erismann

Christophe Erismann,
*Introduction: The Crucial Eastern Step of Byzantine Logic*

Mossman Roueché,
*Greek Philosophical Manuscripts in the Ninth Century Byzantium*

Dirk Krausmüller,
*Pamphilus and Aristotelian Logic*

Zaharia-Sebastian Mateiescu,
*Διαφορά and the Logic of Identifying Differences in Byzantine Theology*

Byron MacDougall,
*The Prolegomena to Rhetoric and Hermogenes and Byzantine Logical Culture*

Torstein Theodor Tollefsen,
*Logic in Theodore the Studite - A Contribution to the Early 9th Century Byzantine Philosophy*

Katerina Ierodiakonou,
*The Sources of Photios’ and Arethas’ Comments on the Categories*

George Karamanolis,
*Substance as Self-Subsistent Entity*

Adam McCollum,
*A Collection of Logical Texts in Syriac (Ms. Vat. sir. 158)*
Christophe Erismann  
(University of Vienna)

**Introduction: The Crucial Eastern Step of Byzantine Logic**

There is general agreement among scholars that the Aristotelian logic used in Byzantium from the ninth century onwards was deeply influenced and determined by the exegetical work of the masters of the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria. Nevertheless, the exact circumstances of this transmission of ideas and books – a vast example of *translatio studiorum* – are still uncertain. The fundamental question remains: by which channels did Alexandrian scholarship reach Constantinople?

Two explanations, one direct and one indirect, have been proposed to account for this transmission. Both have been challenged by recent studies.

The direct explanation relies heavily on the appointment of Stephanus of Alexandria by Heraclius to a chair of philosophy in Constantinople. Stephanus would have brought with him manuscripts – some of which would become the archetypes for the manuscripts of the so-called *Philosophical Collection* (See M. Rashed, “Nicolas d’Otrante, Guillaume de Moerbeke et la ‘Collection philosophique’”, *Studi Medievali* 43 [2002], pp. 693-717) – and given lectures in Constantinople (it has been suggested that Maximus the Confessor attended these lectures). Mossman Roueché has recently questioned, with good arguments, whether the appointment of Stephanus actually took place (see “Stephanus the Philosopher and Ps. Elias: a case of mistaken identity”, *BMGS* 36 [2012]). Nevertheless, there is still evidence that suggests the presence of a foreign philosopher in Constantinople in the seventh century. To begin with, in Ananias of Shirak’s account of his period of study in Trebizond in the 620s with the famous philosopher Tychikos, Ananias explains that Tychikos in turn had, at an earlier period, studied in Constantinople with “a scholar from Athens”, who could be Stephanus. Then there is Theodore of Tarsus, future Archbishop of Canterbury and allegedly trained in Constantinople, who boasts a surprising knowledge of Alexandrian philosophical exegesis, which is difficult to explain without intensive contact with an Alexandrian master. Finally, we still need an explanation for the Alexandrian provenance of the models of – at least some of – the manuscripts of the philosophical collection. Could pseudo-Elias have played a role in this process?

The indirect explanation is related to the region comprising Sinai, Palestine and Syria. Logic was frequently used among Christian thinkers. This use became more intense among theologians debating Christology in the aftermath of Chalcedon from the middle of the sixth century onwards. A group of thinkers particularly invested in logic, and whose activity ranged from compiling collections of definitions to composing proper logical treatises, includes Theodore of Raithu and Anastasius Sinaius, both of Sinai, John of Damascus in Syria and Theodore Abu Qurrah in Palestine. Leontius of Byzantium had strong links to Palestine and Jerusalem. If we accept, instead of the Greek life *Vita Maximi* (BHG 1234), the narrative proposed by the seventh-century Syriac life of Maximus (ed. by S. Brock, “An early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor”, *Analecta Bollandiana* 91 [1973], 299-346) written by George of Resh’aina, even the famous Confessor is to be situated within this geographical and cultural milieu, which would associate him not with the monastery of Chrysopolis opposite Constantinople but rather with the monastery of Chariton in Palestine.
According to Cyril Mango, “the chain of dialectical compendia extending from the 6th century to the early 9th turns out to be exclusively Oriental in origin, consisting as it does of Theodore of Raithu, Maximus Confessor, the Doctrina Patrum, Anastasius Sinaita, John of Damascus and Thedore Abû Qurra, bishop of Harran” (“Greek Culture in Palestine after the Arab Conquest”, in G. Cavallo, G. de Gregorio, M. Maniaci [eds] Scritture, Libri e Testi nelle Aree Provinciali di Bisanzio, Spoleto, 1991, [149-160], p. 158-9). This puts the particular case of the study of logical in perfect conformity with the broader observation of Guglielmo Cavallo about “the recognizable asymmetry in the eastern Byzantine world, between Constantinople and the outlying provinces during the period between the sixth century and the late eighth in the domain of literary culture, authors and texts. That is to say, in Constantinople itself we can see the slow triumph of agroikía (‘rusticity’), whereas in the outlying provences the evidence points to cultural continuity. […] even after they had been lost to the (Roman/Byzantine) empire; […] it is in these centres and provinces where certain roots of the ninth century Byzantine renascence must be sought” (“Theodore of Tarsus and the Greek culture of his time”, p. 55 and 57).

In the case of John of Damascus and Abu Qurrah, their writings would have been received in Constantinople during the ninth century. A copy of the latter’s logical treatise, a text against the Jacobites, was personally owned and annotated by Arethas of Caesarea. As these authors used Alexandrian material, they could indeed have served as vehicles of transmission. This highlights the need to improve our understanding of the place of logic and logical teaching in monastic culture, as well as the specific role of the Syro-palestinian cultural space and the Melkite Church in the transmission of logical learning. Finally, it raises the question of the possible influence of Syriac logical scholarship on Greek-speaking religious communities.

The round table has as its objective the discussion of the transmission of the Alexandrian tradition of Aristotelian logic. It will tackle the issue both by considering the available historical data and by discussing precise examples of contact or influence, in particular by showing doctrinal proximities between texts in the form of explicit quotations or conceptual borrowings.

The round table will start with considerations by M. Roueché about the transfer of manuscripts from Alexandria to Constantinople and the modalities of a possible direct transmission. We will then move to some aspects of the indirect tradition of logic, by considering two case studies related to Porphyry's Introduction to Aristotelian logic, one involving an author and another a concept: the author is Pamphilus, who composed a theological handbook and probably lived in the second half of the sixth century (D. Krausmüller); and the concept is the philosophical term “difference” which came to be central for christology (S. Mateiescu). This section will be completed by a discussion of another indirect tradition of Aristotelian logic, the introductions to rhetoric (B. MacDougall). Then, the last part of the round table will be dedicated to the reception of such material in ninth-century Byzantium by Theodore the Stoudite (T. Tollefsen) and in Photius and Arethas (K. Ierodiakonou). The Byzantine reception of the Alexandrian conception of substance as a self-subsisting entity will be discussed (G. Karamanolis). The last contribution will discuss, on the basis of a study of logical manuscripts, the knowledge of logic in Syriac during the ninth century.

[This round table is organised in the framework of and supported by the ERC project “Reassessing Ninth Century Philosophy. A Synchronic Approach to the Logical Traditions (9 SALT)”, based at the Institute for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies at the University of Vienna]
How the philosophical legacy of 7th century Alexandria made the journey to 9th century Constantinople remains an unsettled question. This is despite the fact that the journey taken by the same philosophical legacy “from Alexandria to Baghdad” in the Greek-to-Arabic translation movement has long been the object of considerable attention from students of the history of Islamic philosophy and medicine. It seems certain that there was a cessation of formal philosophical teaching in Alexandria during the 7th century as a consequence of the successive conquests of the city in 621 by the Persians and in 642 by the Arabs. And it is also evident that there was a renewal of interest in the works of Plato and Aristotle beginning in 9th century Constantinople. Finally, we can see from the extant palaeographic evidence, that is, manuscripts dateable to the 9th century, that there was at that time a reawakened interest in the collection, preservation and transmission of philosophical and mathematical manuscripts, utilising the newly developed minuscule script. Clearly, the philosophical legacy of 7th century Alexandria was delivered to 9th century Constantinople through the medium of Greek of manuscripts containing the philosophical texts and commentaries of that legacy.

This paper addresses the question, therefore, how did these manuscripts find their way to 9th century Constantinople where they became the exemplars of the copies that were studied by the Constantinopolitan philosophers? Three possible answers, not necessarily mutually exclusive, suggest themselves:

(i) During the century prior to the conquest of Alexandria, the manuscripts were brought piecemeal from Alexandria to Constantinople, e.g., by students returning home from their studies.

(ii) At the time of the conquest of Alexandria, a select group of manuscripts was removed from the philosophical school and taken en bloc to Constantinople where it became part of a richly stocked library or private collection.

(iii) In the 9th century the manuscripts were collected piecemeal from locations inside and outside Constantinople to satisfy the growing demands of the Constantinopolitan philosophers.

The first of these possibilities is nothing more than what might have been expected. As the largest city at that time, Constantinople would have had numerous educational structures, from private tutorials to well-organised schools, some of which will have taught philosophy in the Alexandrian manner. Their teachers will have been former students in Alexandria and their texts will have been the manuscripts that they and their fellow students acquired during the course of their studies in Alexandria.

The second possibility seems to contain echoes of a romantic narrative in which the flower of Late Antique Neoplatonism is snatched from the jaws of the advancing invaders and saved for posterity. This narrative has no historical basis and is flawed by its particularity. It may account for the presence in 9th century Constantinople of some philosophical texts, but certainly not all. It also
takes no account of the great cost and physical size of so many manuscripts and the difficulties in transporting them to Constantinople.

The third possibility is one that has been the least well considered although it is the one for which there is the most evidence. The most likely answer is that the manuscripts that were studied in 9th century Constantinople were collected in the 9th century and came from sources scattered within and outside the capital. This becomes clear when we consider that the Greek-to-Arabic translation movement that was also taking place at the same time must have had the same need for exemplars of Greek manuscripts as the 9th century Byzantines. Despite having little or no access to such bibliographic collections that may have existed in Constantinople and other major Byzantine cities still under Byzantine control, Arab philosophers had by the end of the 9th century procured Arabic translations of a large body of Greek philosophical and scientific texts. The exemplars that were used in these translations could only have been procured from the lands that were under Arab rule, i.e., territory that excluded Constantinople and the Byzantine lands. It follows that these exemplars must have been sufficiently available, both in numbers and accessibility, to make the resulting scale of translations into Syriac and Arabic possible. There is no reason to believe that philosophical manuscripts were any less available in Constantinople and the Byzantine lands than they were in Arab-controlled lands. An examination of the evidence of how and where the Arab translators acquired their Greek manuscripts shows that the Constantinopolitan philosophers will have done the same.

The Greek-to-Arabic translation movement has been closely studied by students of Arab and Moslem philosophy, but the evidence that they have uncovered and the fruits of their scholarship are less well known to Byzantinists. A highly informative account of manuscript collecting is provided by the 9th century Nestorian Christian physician who was responsible for making translations of many of the works of Hippocrates and Galen, Hunayn ibn Ishâq (808-873). He wrote an account of his translation work (his Risala) that provides valuable circumstantial information concerning his acquisition of the Greek medical manuscripts that provided the exemplars of the texts that he and his son, Ishâq ibn Hunayn (830-ca.910), translated into Syriac and Arabic. It goes without saying that the ultimate ancestor of every Syriac or Arabic translation must have been at least one Greek manuscript that served as its exemplar, so his comments on the Greek manuscripts he acquired and their condition tell us much about the availability and condition of Greek medical manuscripts in the 9th century. What he tells us of the availability and condition of the Greek medical manuscripts that he acquired will have been true of the contemporary availability and condition of Greek philosophical manuscripts as well. We can be certain of this because Hunayn and his son were also the translators of the majority of the Organon from Greek into Syriac and from Syriac into Arabic.

Another important source of evidence for the availability of Greek philosophical manuscripts is the book catalogue (the Kitâb al-Fihrist) of the 10th century Baghdad book dealer, Ibn al-Nadîm (ob. ca.998). In his entries for the books of the Organon, Ibn al-Nadîm tells us the names of those who translated the works into Syriac and/or Arabic, the Greek commentaries on each work, together with details of any Arabic translations of those Greek commentaries, and the names of Arab authors who have produced “abbreviations and epitomes” of the Greek original. The details he gives of the Greek commentaries and their translations are of particular importance. They show that it was not just the core works of the Organon that were available in Greek at the time of Ibn al-Nadîm, but also the commentaries of the Alexandrian commentators, some of which were said to be of considerable size.
From the evidence of Hunayn ibn Ishâq, Ibn al-Nadîm and others, it is clear that Greek manuscripts were sufficiently available in the Arab lands during the 9th and 10th centuries to support the entire Greek-to-Arabic translation movement without recourse to the bibliographic resources of Constantinople. The same must have been true of the availability of Greek philosophical manuscripts in the Byzantine lands.
PART I: Aristotelian Logic, Christian Theology and Rhetoric

Dirk Krausmüller
(Artaklu University, Mardin)

Pamphilus and Aristotelian logic

In the sixth century there emerges a new theological ontology, which differed considerably from an earlier model developed by the Cappadocian bishops Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa in the late fourth century. The Cappadocians had only recognised two components within each concrete being, the qualities that it shared with other members of the same species and the qualities that marked it out as an individual. By contrast, some theologians of the sixth century introduced a further component, pure being or existence, which precedes all qualification, despite the fact that the Cappadocians had explicitly rejected such a notion. In order to construct their arguments these theologians availed themselves of philosophical and more specifically of Aristotelian concepts. Of particular importance was the so-called arbor Porphyriana, the framework of genera and species, which the third-century philosopher Porphyry had systematised in his treatise called the Isagoge. The Cappadocians had radically simplified this framework by reducing it to the lowest species, which they then juxtaposed with the individuals. Our sixth-century authors were not content with this solution. They again turned to the arbor Porphyriana and adapted it to their needs. They focused on the highest genus, substance, which denotes pure existence, and some of them went so far as to cut out the intermediate genera and species so that the highest genus was directly juxtaposed with the lowest species. The result was an extended Cappadocian framework in which every concrete being has existence as its core, around which the natural and hypostatic properties are then layered. That philosophy could play such a role in theological arguments casts a revealing light on the nature of late Patristic discourse. Theologians not only regarded philosophical concepts as ready-made building blocks from which they could construct their arguments, but also seem to have accepted that such concepts were accurate reflections of reality.

An interesting example is Pamphilus, the author of a theological handbook who probably lived in the second half of the sixth century (Quaestiones, ed. P. Allen, in Diversorum Postchalcedonensium Auctorum Collectanea I: Pamphili Theologi opus, ed. J. H. Declerck, Eustathii Monachi opus, ed. P. Allen (CC, SG, 19; Turnhout, 1989), pp. 127-161). A good part of Pamphilus’ handbook is taken up by definitions of theological key terms. Given their importance both in Trinitarian and in Christological discourse, it comes as no surprise that the terms “substance” and “nature” are discussed at length. As one would expect, Pamphilus starts by reiterating the Cappadocian position that in theological discourse nature and substance mean the same thing (Pamphilus, Quaestiones, II, ed. Allen, p. 139, ll. 120-127). However, he then concedes that one can make distinctions between the two terms. One of these distinctions is relevant to our topic. It reads as follows:

Τινὲς τῶν πατέρων καὶ διδασκάλων σαφηνίζοντες τί σημαίνει τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα, ταύτην εἶπον εἶναι τὴν ποιὰν τῷ παντὶ ὑπάρξιν, οὐχ ἄπλως ὑπάρξιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ποιὰν ἀορίστως, καὶ οἶμαι ὡς ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀνελλιπῶς ὁ ὅρος ἐγκείται. σαφηνείας δὲ χάριν διὰ τοὺς ἔριστικοὺς, εὐγνωμόνως
Some of the fathers and teachers who clarified what the term “nature” signifies, stated that it is the qualified existence for everyone, not pure existence, but the qualified one in an undefined way, and I think that the definition is correct and complete. But for the sake of clarity because of the disputatious who do not wish to hear the words of the fathers in a benevolent manner, one must add “as regards substance”, so that the definition is this: “nature is the qualified existence for everyone as regards the substance of each one.” For “as regards substance” is added, since the most specific difference, that is, the one in the true sense of the word or substantial (sc. difference) of “rationality” is predicated in “what kind of thing it is”, and it is in the human being as regards substance insofar as it is “rationality”. And it is in this respect separated from other species of the same genus and constitutive of the substance “human being”. (sc. We say), then, “according to substance” because of the inseparable accidents, which also distinguish the species and the individuals from each other, however, not according to substance but according to accident. Therefore the Fathers gave the meaning “pure existence” to substance and the meaning “qualified (sc. existence)” to nature, calling “nature” what is present and has grown in the substances in a specific manner, be it according to substance or according to accident.

In the first and last sentence of this difficult passage Pamphilus summarises the position of an earlier theologian whose name he does not mention. The position of this theologian shows clear similarities with the arguments of Leontius of Byzantium, as we argue in this paper. The concept of pure existence has a counterpart in the highest genus of the Solutiones, whereas the distinction between substance as existent and nature as the set of qualities that are added to this existent is found in Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos. This shows clearly that Leontius of Byzantium participated in a broader discourse and furthermore increases the likelihood that there is a link between Leontius’ two arguments.

In order to grasp the full meaning of this passage we need to identify the source from which it is derived. The best starting-point is the strange and almost untranslatable phrase ἔναν τῷ παντὶ ὑπάρξει, which denotes the qualities that accede to pure existence. A TLG search reveals that there is only one close counterpart for this phrase, the sentence ποία παντὶ ζῷῳ υπάρχει in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, which appears in the following context:

In order to grasp problems, one should excerpt both the anatomies and the divisions; and in this way, laying down the genus common to all the subject matter, one should excerpt (if e.g. animals are under consideration) **whatever belongs to every animal**; and having got this, again excerpt **whatever follows every case** of the first of the remaining terms (e.g. if it is bird, whatever follows every bird), and always excerpt in this way whatever follows the nearest term. (The translation is quoted from J. Barnes, *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation* [Princeton, 1984], p. 162.)

In this passage Aristotle explains how one can determine the content of particular genera. One needs to identify ποία παντὶ ὑπάρχει, that is, what qualities are found in every member of a genus. This is evidently not the most obvious port of call for a Christian who wished to make an ontological statement. It is possible that the anonymous theologian was attracted to it because it contained the word ὑπάρχειν, which seemed to offer an appropriate counterpart for pure existence. Comparison shows that the anonymous theologian modified Aristotle’s statement in two ways. Firstly, he replaced Aristotle’s intermediate genera “animal” and “bird” with the highest genus. Secondly, he identified the qualities present in substances with the qualities that characterise the lowest species. Accordingly, Pamphilus offers as an example a quality of one lowest species, the “human being”. The suppression of all intervening genera and species is not without conceptual problems. It requires that specific differences of a higher order are added to the qualities that mark out the lowest species. However, it would be wrong to think that our author was the first to take this step. Already the Cappadocians had reduced the *arbor Porphyriana* to the lowest species, which made it impossible to distinguish between genus and specific difference. The real innovation is the reintroduction of the highest genus as a separate category. A comparison with Leontius’ argument in the *Solutiones* casts further light on this development. There Leontius juxtaposed in the case of God pure existence directly with the *logos* of being, whereas in the case of created species he left the intervening genera and species in place. Thus one can argue that the unknown theologian took the specific case of God as a starting-point and applied it to created species as well, thus establishing a universally valid ontological framework.

However, can we be sure that this model was applied to God? Unfortunately Pamphilus only reproduces the definition itself and tells us nothing about the purpose that it originally served. Yet he does give us one precious piece of information when he informs us that the concept of qualified existence had incurred strong criticism. Other authors had pointed out that the qualities were not sufficiently distinguished from mere accidents. This complaint is probably based on a misunderstanding. However, it suggests that the model was specifically developed for the divinity. Only there the presence of accidents constituted a major theological problem because it endangered the simplicity of the divine nature. Interestingly, Pamphilus thinks that he can offer a solution to this problem. He declares that the qualities that make up “nature” must be identified with specific differences such as “rational” in the case of the human species. In his view specific differences pass muster because they are constitutive of substances and thus can themselves be regarded as substantial. This argument is most likely again based on the writings of Porphyry who had declared that parts of substances are themselves substances (Porphyry, *In Categorias Commentarium*, ed. Busse, p. 94, ll. 17-19).
Διαφορά and the Logic of Identifying Differences in Byzantine Theology

One central source for important theological debates in the aftermath of Chalcedon was the understanding of the (unconfused) union of the divine and human natures in Christ. The argument often revolved around interpretation of one important term of this formula, namely the word ἄλλο. This paper argues that the participants in the debate also used a corresponding formulation of that problem in terms of how it is possible to identify a (specific) difference (διαφορά) in order to preserve the union unconfused. To identify differences was certainly a common topic in ancient logic, where the procedure of defining something essentially involved adding the correct specific difference to the common genus. The theological interpretation of the union of the two natures in Christ had recourse to the definition of those natures and implicitly to the essential properties that differentiated one nature from the other. Hence, διαφορά appears as a tool for the logical reasoning involved in key theological arguments in Byzantium, and the aim of this talk is to document this with references to several approaches stemming both from Chalcedonian and anti-Chalcedonian communities.

We shall start with analyzing a debate about the status of διαφορά that took place in the 6th century non-Chalcedonian community. This involved, among others, Probus, who initially constructed his arguments as a non-Chalcedonian but finally converted to the Chalcedonian position that difference is an essential quality. The implication of this formula for Christology eventually became apparent to him: since Christ manifests through his acts two different substantial properties, divine and human, then he must be acknowledged as having two corresponding natures for these substantial properties. It is exactly this link between essential properties and natures that Severus of Antioch later denied, and thus the ontological status of διαφορά came to the fore. Severus accepted at a certain point in the development of his theology the necessity to use the word 'two' when discussing Christ. However, he restricted his use of the word to properties, divine and human, linked to the same subject, and did not acknowledge a difference in the natures defined by those properties. For Severus, the union of natures in the single subject of Christ eludes the ontological status of the difference between the two substances of Christ. Implicit in this is that the divine and the human essential properties lose any ontological character and become merely conceptual.

Maximus the Confessor later reacted to this argument very critically. In Epistle 12 (PG. 91, 485C-D) the Confessor began his reply to this issue by defining the status of quality as an essential difference and as dependent on a substance, in the sense that it has no existence by itself. Maximus' strategy will be to compel the anti-Chalcedonians into accepting a disjunction: either the properties are dependent on natures, because they do not exist in themselves as hypostases do, or they do not exist at all, tertium non datur. The terms used by Maximus can be traced to Porphyry's 'constitutive difference' (διαφορά συστατική) and 'specific difference' (εἰδοποιὸς διαφορά). For example, according to the Isagoge, rationality is a divisive or specific difference for the substance of animal, but at the same time it is constitutive for the species of man. The same terminology had been found earlier than Maximus in the case of Probus, and we shall argue that it can also be found in a particular
middle byzantine handbook of logic that could well have been influenced by the Confessor. Hence, Maximus seems to be a recipient of this current of thought, but at the same time added something new to it. He offered metaphysical content to these logical tools: for Maximus, the specific and constitutive difference is motion. This comes straight from Maximus’ metaphysical reading of the story of creation, according to which God is the creator and the cause that puts in motion the created substance of the world. Once the fundamental aspect of motion as a consequence of the doctrine of creation is accepted, its essential character follows from its ontological role of being constitutive of the species. Therefore, if in Porphyry one can limit analysis to a logical evaluation of essential difference as a predicate or concept, in Maximus this essential ingredient enters the core of *ousia* itself and inheres in the essence as an accompanying motion of it. Hence, according to Maximus’ theory, there are some essential properties that differ from the rest of the properties that an entity can have; these are constitutive and specific differences. They are part of the essence and, stripped of them, each being disappears. This is why, even if one can observe them theoretically, as Severus does, one must go a step further in claiming their ontological status. The later positive reception of this logic of difference in John of Damascus proves that this came to be accepted as the standard understanding of διαφορά in the pro-Chalcedonian milieu. As a result, it would be tempting to conclude that one could identify the difference between the Chalcedonians and the anti-Chalcedonians according to their logic of identifying differences: more exactly, depending on the ontological interpretation of διαφορά as an essential quality that complements substance or, on the contrary, as a predicate or concept lacking concrete reality, one could forge his argument for the former or latter side respectively.
The Prolegomena to Rhetoric and Hermogenes and Byzantine Logical Culture

Huge Rabe's 1931 edition of a Prolegomenon Sylloge offers a collection of 34 prolegomena to the rhetorical curriculum, which were originally composed and compiled during different periods from Late Antiquity to the last centuries of Byzantium. These prolegomena comprise both general introductions to the study of rhetoric itself, as well as specific introductions for four of the individual books of the corpus of Hermogenes, namely the Progymnasmata of Aphthonius, the De Inventione (not by Hermogenes), the De Statibus, and the De Ideis. The present paper will demonstrate how this corpus of texts, whose popularity is attested by a large manuscript tradition, offers a new perspective on the question of the transmission of philosophical and logical culture from Alexandria to Constantinople, as well as the resurgence of Aristotelian logic in the ninth century.

Rabe himself showed how these rhetorical prolegomena, beginning already with the Late Antique specimens among them, owe much to the philosophical prolegomena produced by the Alexandrian masters. George Kustas notes that “both the structure and the content of the prolegomena owe much to the techniques of instruction and commentary in use in Neoplatonic circles, particularly in Alexandria,” adding that they are “replete with terms, definitions and quotations having their sources or their parallel in our Neoplatonic philosophical commentaries,” (Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric, p. 26). From Aristotle's own four questions that are to be asked before studying any subject (“if it is, what it is, what sort of thing it is, and why it is”), to the ten questions to be asked before beginning the study of Aristotelian philosophy which appear in Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus, Olymiodorus, David and Elias, and which the latter attests are owed ultimately to Proclus, to what are described as the “famous chapters”, the seven or eight questions (σκοπός, χρήσιμον, etc.) to be asked before reading a specific work - this organizational apparatus, so familiar from the Alexandrian commentators, appears again and again in the rhetorical prolegomena, either in an adapted form or carefully adhering to the Alexandrian scheme.

Moreover, these questions, including the sets of four, of ten, and of seven, all serve as vehicles for importing into the rhetorical commentaries a number of ideas and methods drawn from the logical tradition. In other words, these questions and chapters, which are often explicitly presented in the rhetorical prolegomena as being the sort one asks in the study of philosophical texts, do not lead simply to discussions, say, of the σκοπός of Aphonion's progymnasmata. They serve in addition as an opportunity to import large tracts of material from the Alexandrian philosophical commentaries themselves. One can consider for example the definition of definition, a subject which features especially frequently during treatment of the Aristotelian question, τί ἐστι. Just as we might see in the pages of David or Elias, we learn in Trophonios the Sophist, whom Rabe dates not later than the sixth century and whose close textual relationship with David Rabe also emphasizes, that a definition is formed from a genus and specific differences (Rabe I.11.12-12). One finds the same understanding of definition in several other prolegomena which Rabe associates with the 5th-6th centuries, and which he characterizes as steeped in that "philosophia scholastica, quam accurate
cognoscimus ex Davidis et Eliae scriptis, discipulorum Olympiodori.” Or take one of the sets of prolegomena to Hermogenes’ De Statibus, whose author, according to Rabe, “non erat Christianus”: here one learns that there are five modes of division (διαίρεσις): from genus to species, from whole to parts, from species of essence to accidents, from accident to essence, or from a homonymous word into its various significations (Rabe XIII.196.24-7.14). One finds almost exactly the same scheme in Elias’ prolegomena (67-68), except that he offers a sixth mode, from species to individual. The examples could be multiplied at length.

These rhetorical prolegomena thus share a common literary heritage with the tradition of Alexandrian Neoplatonism and the commentators on Aristotle and Porphyry. It is not surprising that Rabe suggests that one of the rhetorical commentators may even have been a student of Olympiodorus himself. The Late Antique rhetorical prolegomena constitute a major vehicle for the transmission and diffusion of the Alexandrian logical Gedankengut. In the eleventh century they are reworked into two of the ripest examples of Byzantine rhetorical theory, namely the commentaries on the corpus of Hermogenes by John Siceliotes and John Doxapatres. This paper concludes by looking at another, earlier period characterized by intellectual ferment in order to assess the role of the prolegomena and their rich supply of philosophical ideas in the renewed interest in Aristotelian logic during the 9th century. Can one measure the impact of the ninth-century reception of the prolegomena against that of possible direct contact with the Alexandrian commentators? Where in a ninth-century curriculum would these rhetorical prolegomena have featured relative to the commentaries on the Isagoge, for example? One of the commentators on Aphthonios’ Progymnasmata, whom Rabe (xlvi) argues could not have lived much later than the fifth century, declares that Aphthonios belongs not to the practical nor the theoretical part of philosophy, but “to the middle of these”, to the “organikon, that is, the logikon” (Rabe VIII.79.19-24). If Late Antique and Byzantine teachers believed that the corpus of Hermogenes belonged to the philosophical organon, then we should take them seriously and investigate the prolegomena to rhetoric and Hermogenes as a possible vehicle for the indirect transmission of the Aristotelian logical tradition.
PART II: The Reception of Alexandrian Aristotelian Logic in the Ninth Century

Torstein Theodor Tollefsen
(University of Oslo)

Logic in Theodore the Studite - A Contribution to early 9th Century Byzantine Philosophy

It is well known that Nicephorus of Constantinople (ca. 750/58-828) and Theodore the Studite (759-826) made use of a particular kind of logic in their defence of the holy icons. Scholars have called this logic Aristotelian. If that is the case, it should be taken as Aristotelian in the sense of the logic of the Neoplatonist schools. However, there are features of this logic that seem to stem from other quarters, viz. from the Stoics.

Theodore's modern biographers have not been able to identify what kind of philosophical material he studied during his education. The biographical sources, in accordance with the traditional, hagiographical genre, make rather general and edifying statements. There are, on the other hand, some interesting pages in Ignatius the Deacon’s vita of the patriarch Nicephorus that are a bit more promising. Ignatius offers a list of philosophical topics Nicephorus studied in his early retirement from secular activity. In a footnote to the English translation Talbot (Byzantine Defenders of Images, Eight Saint's Lives in English Translation 54 [1998] n.109) suggests that Ignatius copied the list from headings in an elementary textbook of logic and physics that has not been identified. That may well of course be the case. However, the list is quite long, and if it is copied from a textbook that must have been rather comprehensive. Most of what is listed is obviously material of Aristotelian provenance, i.e. it comes from the tradition of the mainly Neoplatonist commentators. There are, though, some indications that the textbook — if it really was a textbook — also contained material from some Stoic source, such as one of the list's headings on “what kind of syllogism has only one premise”. Whatever Nicephorus read, whether a textbook or books by commentators, it is not improbable that the same material would have been available to Theodore, since they were contemporaries and both came from Constantinople.

Theodore's Antirrhetici tres adversus iconomachos attest to knowledge of several logical topics. We find a doctrine of universals, a list of categories, a theory of synonymy and homonymy, an application of the category of the relative, and the construction of arguments called syllogisms. The three treatises are internally related to one another, but they differ markedly. The arguments are in general put forward, as he says in the introduction to the first treatise, antithetically (κατὰ ἀντίθεσιν), so that it is possible to see by juxtaposition (διὰ τῆς παραθέσεως) Theodore's own arguments and the arguments of his iconoclast opponent. All three treatises are characterized by argument and counter-argument, so that we have a kind of pro et contra argumentation. Each refutation has its own character. The first confronts systematically iconoclast and iconophile arguments throughout the whole exposition but ends, though, in a series of anathemata. The second refutation is constructed as a dialogue with no care for describing a setting or a scene. What counts is, like in the first refutation, the arguments that are played out against one another. The third is more of a systematic exposition of iconophile doctrine but with reference to several iconoclast opinions.
This description may give the impression that Theodore enters the struggle with his iconoclast opponent in a rather unbiased and scholarly way. As a matter of fact it seems to me that he does not consciously distort the iconoclast case nor make his own position easy to defend. Of course, he wins the contest since he is in complete control of the development of the discussion. But even so I would say he does not avoid the real issues and he even modifies his views in confrontation with iconoclast objections.

The logical topics will be further elaborated in the final paper. What I offer here is just a summary of what will be the substantial part of this article:

(1) Theodore has a doctrine of universals. He does not elaborate this topic much, but we can see features that he has in common with earlier thinkers: he does not hold that universals are dependent on the human mind alone. They somehow (it is not easy to say exactly how) exist in particulars and are gathered from them through experience into a concept in the human mind. Universals as existing in the particulars are somehow individualized and circumscribed by the addition of certain properties and accidents that may be classified in a list of categories. Universals existing in the mind are uncircumscribed since they extend to all particulars of a certain kind.

(2) The list of categories is a list of circumscriptions that a being may suffer. Theodore's list contains genuine Aristotelian categories like quantity, quality, position, place, and time. It includes also some items that are not in Aristotle, like inclusion, shape, and body. It is remarkable that relative is missing, since this category plays an important role in Theodore's defence of the icons. There are several things here that need to be highlighted.

(3) Synonymy and homonymy are applied in order to highlight and defend a certain way of speaking of the icons: ‘For whatever is said concerning the prototype, the same may be said concerning the derivation [i.e. the image], however, in the case of the prototype it is said in a synonymous way, because it is said properly, but in case of the derivation it is said in a homonymous way, since it is not said properly,’ (Antirrheticus 2. 16, PG 99: 360d). What is interesting here is the shift of focus from the universal to the particular: it is well known that both the universal name and its definition may be predicated synonymously of an item, but we find here that a singular name (term) and definite descriptions related to that name may be predicated synonymously of the prototype and homonymously of the image. We may say synonymously of Christ that this is Christ and that this is He who was crucified and He who rose on the third day. We may say homonymously of the icon that this is Christ and this is He who was crucified etc.

(4) The category of the relative is applied by Theodore in order to support the above version of synonymous and homonymous predication and in order to emphasise the unity of veneration of Christ and the icon. The icon is shown to be related to Christ in such a way that the material entity as such is somehow absorbed into the reality of the paradigm.

(5) One of the most interesting aspects of Theodore's logic is his application of argumentative forms that he believes to be Aristotelian. It is actually possible to identify some proper Aristotelian syllogisms in the texts (I have at least found one), but the argumentative forms are generally Stoic. They can mainly be reduced to the first two Stoic 'indemonstrables' (the modus ponens and modus tollens). It seems to me possible that Theodore may have found such logical
structures in a handbook, but I really doubt that he would be capable to apply them the way he does without some practical training. — Where did he get that?

It is one thing to identify the above concepts and figure out their ancestry theoretically, but it is quite difficult to know practically which sources were available in early ninth-century Constantinople.
The Sources of Photios’ and Arethas’ Comments on the Categories

The earliest surviving texts of post-iconoclast Byzantine philosophy are the comments on Aristotle’s Categories by the patriarch of Constantinople Photios (c.810–after 893) and by the archbishop of Caesarea Arethas (c.850–932/944). Photios’ comments are extant in the form of a few still unedited scholia as well as in the form of a continuous text under the title Clear Summary of the Ten Categories; this summary seems to be a later version of his more detailed commentary, and fills eleven chapters of his collection of essays Amphilochia (Epistulae et Amphilochia, vol. V, ed. L. G. Westerink [ed.], Leipzig 1986, 137-47). Arethas’ scholia are found in a single manuscript, Vaticanus Urbinas graecus 35 ff. 21v-29r, most probably written in Arethas’ own hand, but break off for no obvious reason right after the beginning of the category of quantity; these scholia have recently been published in a critical edition (Arethas of Caesarea’s Scholia on Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Categories, ed. M. Share, Commentaria in Aristotelem Byzantina 1, Athens 1994). My aim is to contribute to the discussion about the transmission of the commentary tradition of Aristotelian logic, by attempting to detect the various philosophical influences on these central Byzantine works. The prevailing view in the secondary literature is that the main influence comes from the Neoplatonic commentators, and it is true that one often recognizes Porphyry’s, Ammonius’ and Simplicius’ voices in the background of Photios’ and Arethas’ logical texts. But these are certainly not the only authors from whom Photios and Arethas drew extensively. Arethas, for instance, made constant use of the commentaries of Philoponus, Olympiodorus and Elias without mentioning them, and it is not at all clear whether he himself excerpted them from the original commentaries, whether he found them in a single manuscript, or whether he assembled them from more than one. In addition, although John of Damascus’ influence is often evident, the Byzantine commentators do not explicitly refer to him nor, for that matter, to Theodore Abu Qurrah, whose logical treatise Arethas owned and annotated. Since the Byzantines did not mention in most cases the authors on whose writings they heavily relied, and since they seem to have drawn their material from different texts at different sections of their writings, the task of revealing their sources is not straightforward, and the results are not always conclusive. Nevertheless, I think it is worthwhile and important to examine the variety of sources used by the early Byzantine commentators of Aristotle’s Categories in order to trace the stages in the development of Aristotelian logic, but also in order to be in a position to assess the much debated originality of the Byzantine thinkers.
Substance as self-subsistent entity

The understanding of substance as self-subsistent entity is an idea elaborated by the masters of the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria in the framework of the exegesis of Aristotle’s Categories. This idea has a considerable posterity in Byzantine philosophy. For our purpose two phases of this history are particularly interesting to comment upon: the contribution of Photius and Psellos. In the ninth century Photius mentions this concept explicitly (Amphilochia, 138.26-29): Παρὰ μέντοι τὰ εἰρημένα λέγεται οὐσία καὶ πᾶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοσύστατον, οὗ καὶ τὸν λόγον εἰκότως ἄν τις ποδοίη, πρᾶγμα εἶναι λέγων αὐθύπαρκτον, μὴ δεόμενον ἑτέρου πρὸς ὕπαρξιν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, πῦρ, γῆ καὶ τὰ ὁμοία.

Then in the eleventh century, in a short treatise on whether substance is a self-subsistent entity (Phil. Min. Opus 7) Psellus addresses the question of the sense in which substance (ousia) can qualify as self-subsistent (authyparktos), as was claimed, he says, by philosophers of the past. But the question, asks Psellus, is, first, what do we mean by the term “self-subsistent” and, second, whether any of the senses of “self-subsistent” can reasonably apply to substance. Does an entity qualify as “self-subsistent” if it exists by itself, i.e. is ontologically independent, or, alternatively, when it exists without being caused by some antecedent cause, that is, causally independent, asks Psellus. Psellus argues for the former option; for, he argues, no being (on) is without cause; the only sense in which an entity deserves to be called “self-subsistent” is in an ontological sense, that is, when no other being is needed for it to exist.

There are at least three interesting things in this small piece of philosophical prose; first, that Psellus addresses a philosophical question that is not of exegetical nature and seeks to determine his personal position by working out what the concepts suggest; second, his method of doing so involves the division and subordination of all beings from top down, what he describes as “hypovasis”, namely “descent”, a Neoplatonic term, indicative of Psellus’ philosophical education and inclination. Finally, Psellus confines his inquiry to the sensible realm and opts for an Aristotelian solution inspired by the Categories. Substance in the Categories is ontologically but not causally self-subsistent; for individuals (like Socrates) are caused by antecedent causes (his parents), yet depend on no other being for their existence. Psellus seems to imply that the term “self-subsistent” is used in a different sense in the theological discourse (concerning God) and in the ontological discourse. In the latter there is no self-subsistent entity in the causal sense, including intelligible ones (e.g. substance).
A Collection of Logical Texts in Syriac (ms Vat. sir. 158)

The Syriac manuscript Vat. sir. 158, probably produced in the ninth (or tenth) century, contains several texts related to Aristotelian logic and may thus serve as an exemplary case-study of a self-contained logical collection in one manuscript produced in or around the ninth century. Its contents include primary texts (Aristotle’s Categories, Peri hermeneias, and Prior Analytics), what we might call an intermediary text (Porphyry’s Eisagoge), and further supplementary texts on these, such as commentaries, a diagrammatic outline several folios long, and a life of Aristotle and a short introduction to his works. This paper, intended for an audience not necessarily conversant with Syriac, will focus on this collection of texts by discussing several questions about its contents and their arrangement, both on its own and in comparison with manuscripts similar in type in Syriac (including some Tochterhandschriften that used Vat. sir. 158 as a Vorlage), Greek, Arabic, and Armenian.

Aristotelianism and Greek into Syriac

By far the majority of literature translated into Syriac comes from Greek. While this Greek-to-Syriac literature is made up of much that is patently and explicitly religious — such as the Bible in more than one version, commentaries on the Bible, liturgical texts, homilies, and hagiography — there is also no small amount of non-Christian Greek literature. This ranges from gnomological collections to well-known Greek philosophical texts. In the latter category we have especially works connected to the Corpus Aristotelicum, on both the physical and the logical sides. To mention only a few: the pseudo-Aristotelian De mundo, the Categories, Peri hermeneias, the Prior Analytics, and Porphyry’s Eisagoge. To judge from surviving manuscripts, some of these philosophical texts, especially on logic, continued to be read and copied well into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

This translated Aristotelian material also occasioned and inspired several works written in Syriac by authors such as Proba, Sergius of Rēšʾainā, Severus Sebokṭ, Jacob of Edessa, Išoḥbokʰ of Rev Ardašir, Patriarch Timothy I, Dionysius bar Ṣlibi, Yaʾqub bar Šakko, and Gregory bar ʾEbrāyā. In addition, Paul the Persian, author of at least two works touching on logic, may have written in Middle Persian, but this is not certain and these works survive only in Syriac. Finally, as in Greek, in Syriac we have a number of texts that combine both theology and logic, such as surviving texts from John Philoponus (written in Greek but mostly surviving only in Syriac), an apologetic treatise of a certain Elia addressed to Leo of Ḥarrān, Theodore bar Koni’s Book of Scholia (incorporating some work of Silvanus of Qardu), and an apologetic treatise of Nonnus of Nisibis.

The texts in the manuscript

Here follows a listing of the contents of Vat. sir. 158 with a few remarks.

f. 1v Story on Porphyry and the Eisagoge (incomplete)
This work is called a story (\textit{taš iḫā,} the same word used in titles of Syriac hagiography) and presents a view of Porphyry’s life and the writing of the \textit{Eisagoge} for Chrysaorius. Unfortunately only this one page of the work survives, but later in this manuscript this story becomes the subject of a lemmatized commentary.

\textit{ff. 2r-16r} Porphyry’s \textit{Eisagoge} (leaves missing at the beginning)

While Aristotle’s own works may be considered primary for logic (in Greek as well as in Syriac), the \textit{Eisagoge}, whether it is an introduction to the \textit{Categories}, to logic, or even to philosophy considered more broadly, stands on another level. Nevertheless, commentators both Greek and Syriac found the \textit{Eisagoge} to be well worth commenting on in its own right, just like the works of Aristotle. This work, then, might best be considered an intermediary text between the works of Aristotle and the commentaries on the works of Aristotle. The Syriac text of the \textit{Eisagoge} in this manuscript is the second Syriac translation of the work, an earlier one having been made in the sixth century. The colophon to the text as it stands in this manuscript runs as follows:

Finished is the \textit{Eisagoge} of Porphyry the philosopher, which was translated from Greek into Syriac as accurately as possible by the pious brother Mār Athanasius of the holy Monastery of Bēṯ Malkā in the year 956 [Anno Graecorum] in the month of January [= 645 CE].

This translator, Athanasius, studied with Severus Sebokʰt (mentioned above) at the Monastery of Qennešre and he also penned an introduction to logic.

\textit{ff. 16r-26r} A diagrammatic outline for logical terms

Diagrams to illustrate the relationships of certain logical terms and categories are not uncommon in the manuscripts of logical works in various languages, but rarely do they span so many folios. Here, across ten folios we have several diagrams under the title \textit{Divisions of the Eisagoge of Porphyry the Philosopher} covering, for example, what genus is predicated on, the divisions of \textit{ousia}, the divisions of the propositions in syllogisms, and the division of difference and differences.

\textit{ff. 26v-27r} An introduction to Aristotle’s writings

The title of the work is \textit{Something showing the causes for which Aristotle the philosopher composed all his work.} It deals exclusively with Aristotle’s logical works.

\textit{ff. 27r-27v} Life of Aristotle

The title of this short work is \textit{The story of Aristotle in brief.} It covers the basics of Aristotle’s life, well known from other sources in other languages, too, and mentions Aristotle’s students.

\textit{ff. 27v-63v} Aristotle, \textit{Categories}

Here we have the Syriac translation of Jacob of Edessa. There are two other extant versions: an earlier, anonymous, translation, and another translation by Jacob’s near contemporary, George, Bishop of the Arabs. But it is Jacob’s version that, to judge from surviving manuscripts, had the widest circulation among Syriac readers.

\textit{ff. 63v-95v} Aristotle, \textit{Peri hermeneias}

\textit{ff. 95v-107r} Aristotle, \textit{Prior Analytics}
ff. 107r-131r Commentary on Porphyry’s *Eisogoge*

The rubric for this part of the manuscript runs: *Commentaries of the *Eisagoge*: Seven *kephalaia necessary for us (to ask) before (we study) every book.* Included also in this section of the manuscript, on ff. 129r-131r and continuing on 134r — written, it seems, in another hand — is the commentary (*nuhhārā*) to the “story” on f. 1v mentioned above. This commentary has much in common with the prolegomena-commentaries well known from earlier commentators writing in Greek.

ff. 131r-135r Letters to Priests and Deacons

The last set of texts fits incongruously with the rest of the manuscript’s contents: these few letters have no explicitly logical content at all. They may, however, have served as rhetorical models for Syriac letter-writing.

*Comparanda manuscripta Syriaca &c.*

This manuscript was copied *in extenso* (or mostly so) at least a few times some centuries later. These “Tochterhandschriften” are Firenze BML Or. 209 [Assemani 196] (1585 CE), Firenze BML Or. 174 [Assemani 183-184] (1592 CE), and BnF syr. 248 (1637 CE). Other distinct Syriac logical manuscripts that will serve us as comparanda, aside from some fragments, include: BL Add. 14658 (7th cent.), BL Add. 14659 (8th/9th cent.), BL Add. 14660 (9th/10th cent.), BnF syr. 354 (the first part, from 1224 CE), Berlin 88 (1259/60), India Office 9 (16th-18th cent.), Camb. Add. 2011 (18th cent.), Camb. Add. 3284 (18th cent.), Camb. Add. 2812 (1806 CE), and Berlin 89 (=1882). Naturally, a more immediate value lies with the manuscripts closest in probable age to Vat. sir. 158, but even the later copies deserve consideration, not least because they give us a possible glimpse of their *Vorlagen*. In addition, these later copies show us what later (sometimes much later!) students of logic in Syriac may have had at their disposal, and in what arrangements, just as Vat. sir. 158 shows us the same for the period around the ninth century.

We will also consider, although more briefly, a few manuscripts of related subject matter in Greek, Armenian, and Arabic. We have some such earlier manuscripts in Greek, but in Armenian and Arabic the copies are later (from around the thirteenth century and later).

*Some questions*

As we consider the textual material that this manuscript offered to the interested reader in the ninth or tenth century (and later), some questions come to mind. First, why these texts and not others? Can we say what made the scribe include exactly this collection of texts in the manuscript? And why are the texts in this order? Some of them have an obvious connection, as in the case of the *Eisagoge*, the *Categories*, *Peri hermeneias*, and the *Prior Analytics*. We thus have the first three parts of the *Organon* prefaced by the *Eisagoge*. But interspersed among these we also have a few commentaries, commentary-like material, and very brief orientations to the logical curriculum. The manuscript’s end is the ill-fitting group of a few letters, which, as mentioned above, may at least have made an accompanying rhetorical contribution. So, leaving aside this last text-group, we have a fairly comprehensive initial course in logic, a course offering both the foundational texts from Aristotle and the intermediary “introduction” of Porphyry, as well as supplementary, perhaps more gentle, guides which might have been especially suitable for beginners in a logical curriculum.
Concluding aim

This manuscript, at least in part, has been discussed to some degree by Anton Baumstark and, more recently, Henri Hugonnard-Roche. It has, however, never been studied in detail as a whole package of logical material as prepared in or around the ninth century. This investigation, then, following the outline, questions, and comparanda given above, has as its goal exactly that focused study of the transmission of a heavily Greek-based course into the hands of a Syriac reader. One advantage of this kind of study is that we are thus considering a real textual artifact, that is, an actual collection of several closely related texts side-by-side in a single codex that is relatively fixed in time (if not place) that would have been available all together to a prospective reader then and thereafter; we are thus not considering the history of Syriac literature or of philosophy on the basis of a more abstract collection of texts gathered from several manuscripts of different places and time periods, or worse, merely from printed editions. At the minimum, we can be sure that at least the texts compiled in this codex, which was itself copied more or less intact a few times in the following centuries, were available to some readers beginning sometime in the ninth century or soon thereafter.