Speaking Bitterness: 
History, Media and Nation in Twentieth Century China

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Abstract:  

“Speaking bitterness” is the dominant narrative pattern of modern Chinese history. We argue here that it also structures historical fiction. “Speaking bitterness” transforms local stories of personal suffering into collective narratives of blood and tears. It is a discursive practice that may simultaneously construct Nation and Subject, blending individual stories into collective memory that claims – or counterclaims – to be “truth written in blood”.

We focus on various “texts”: four film versions of the Opium War, the trial of Jiang Qing as part of the Gang of Four, and Hou Hsiao-hsien’s film, *City of Sadness*.
The films of the Opium War speak bitterness against Western imperialism in China. But there are significant differences in the four versions that relate to current Chinese politics and ideology: *Eternal Flame* (directed under Japanese occupation in China in 1943), *Lin Zexu and the Opium War* (directed by Zheng Junliu and Cen Fan in the PRC in 1959), *The Opium War* (directed by Li Quanxi in Taiwan in 1963) and *The Opium War* (directed by Xie Jin in the PRC to mark the 1997 handover of Hong Kong).

The trial of Jiang Qing was also a state-run media event. Televised excerpts of the court room drama, contemporary cartoons and published reminiscences all emphasized “past bitterness and present sweetness”. The bitterness relates to the ten years of chaos during the Cultural Revolution; the sweetness refers to the opening-up of China under Deng Xiaoping. Whereas Jiang Qing is demonized in the trial and in public memory, her husband, Mao Zedong (who launched the Cultural Revolution) is variously remembered as a tyrant, god and hero. Finally, we turn to Hou Hsiao-hsien’s 1989 film on the so-called February 28 Incident, *City of Sadness*. Unlike the previous examples, Hou’s film serves as counter-history beyond the nation-state.

We conclude from these examples, that while a modern phenomenon, speaking bitterness retains traditional elements of history-fiction. As in traditional China, history and fiction interweave, narrating an intelligible and inherently moral universe. Yet there are fundamental changes. First, the form of history and “fiction” in most cases becomes linear, progressive and future-directed, not episodic and cyclic. Second, the primary audience is the citizenry as “people” or “masses”, not a scholarly elite. Third, history is told using mass media suited to reaching these “people”, such as cartoons, film, radio and television, none of which are literacy-dependent. Fourth, dominant historical narratives at any one time rely on media control by elites who have the capacity to block, blunt, blur or erase counter-narratives as national narratives. All these elites narrate the construction of China (and Taiwan) as a modern nation-state, characterized by a people bound by (amongst other things) a shared history and a sense of historical collective agency. That agency is often dependent on a “logic of the wound”, inscribed as cultural memory that both defines China as a nation and its motivation for future action.
關鍵字：
中國、國家觀念、國家主義、傳媒、電影、歷史。

摘要：
众所周知，中國近代史充滿著悲壯的場面。在史學家的筆下，不少歷史人物以悲天憫人的哀情，訴說出一段段的傷心事。作為一種史學體材，"訴苦"不僅把個人的悲劇化作全國上下的血淚史，而且把國家與個人的命運用血泪連結起來，構成牢不可破的集體意識。

本文從"訴苦"的角度深入分析三種"文本"：描寫鴉片戰爭的幾部電影，审判四人幫的傳媒宣传，和侯孝賢拍的《悲情城市》。

描寫鴉片戰爭的電影，總共有四部。它們分別是日治時代拍的《永恆的火焰》，五十年代 鄧君里拍的《林則徐》，六十年代台灣李泉溪拍的《鴉片戰爭》，和九十年代謝賢拍的《鴉片戰爭》。這四部電影都是訴說西方列強侵華所造成的苦難，但它們無論選材與佈局都顯有不同，反映了不同時代中國的政治特色和主流思想。

審判四人幫的傳媒宣傳，焦點集中於江青一人身上。不管是電視報導、卡通漫畫，或是出版文章，大都強調"苦尽甘來"，盡去十年文革的苦難，迎來鄧小平的改革開放。為了創造新的集體意識，傳媒宣傳一方面盡辦法丑化江青，另一方面以不同方式回憶她的丈夫毛澤東的伟大。與此相反，台灣的侯孝賢以二二八事件為中心拍攝《悲情城市》，對國族歷史作出批判。

根據上述文本，我們認為"訴苦"既是傳統史學的延續，也是近代的產物。在繼承傳統方陎，"訴苦"是以文學家豐富的幻想力去敘述歷史事實，從而達到道德教訓的目的。作為新時代的產物，"訴苦"中所敘述的歷史事實再不是周而復始、循環不息，而是逐步演化，層層相因。它的主要對像再不是達官貴人，而是平民百姓。它傳播信息的渠道是大眾化的，包括卡通、電影、電台、和電視等等。它既可以是國家意識和主流思想的傳播工具，也可以是民間反對力量的表達。不管是官方喉舌或是民意表達，"訴苦"的結果就是以苦難和創傷去激發起國家意識，使國民
悠然而生憂國憂民之心和同仇敵汽之情。苦難和創傷所帶來的，是對國族的認同和美好將來的憧憬。

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Introduction

Lies written in ink cannot obscure a truth written in blood.

Lu Xun (鲁迅)\(^1\)

“Speaking bitterness” is the dominant narrative pattern of modern Chinese history. We argue here that it also structures historical fiction. “Speaking bitterness” transforms local stories of personal suffering into collective narratives of blood and tears. It is a discursive practice that may simultaneously construct Nation and Subject\(^2\), blending individual stories into collective memory that claims – or counterclaims – to be “truth written in blood”.

Our focus is interdisciplinary: “speaking bitterness” performed through Chinese texts from the modern mass media. Given state control of the media – especially in the People’s Republic under Mao Zedong (毛泽东) but also in Taiwan until the lifting of martial law – these texts function as crucial links in the communicative chain from elite, official historiography to popularized versions for a mass audience. But, as we demonstrate, narratives invite counter-narratives, both official and unofficial. We argue that such texts function as history-fiction and chart the highly contested making, re-making and un-making of popular cultural memory in China.

This essay is positioned at the interface between cultural studies and history. Chinese historiography has moved across disciplines through the work of such scholars as Gail Herschatter, Prasenjit Duara and the Heidelberg group.\(^3\) Herschatter et.al. describe the engagement both within and without the China field as “multiple conversations”. In the process,

[c]ustomary lines of demarcation that formerly kept one group of scholars from speaking with another, boundaries that defined historical subjects, genders, borders, and eras, have been crossed, erased, denounced. China historians are no longer preoccupied with speaking only with one another;

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1 Leys 1988: 206.
2 Anagnost 1997: 43.
we have moved out of the shtetl and into a cross-disciplinary polyglot metropolis.\(^4\)

As part of these “multiple conversations”, our work relies on case studies of a range of modern media, especially the cinema but also other visual forms such as television and cartoons. These studies reveal that there is no clear distinction between historical and fictional Chinese narrative that encompasses the Chinese translingual appropriation of modern historiography. Plaks argues that historiography so dominated traditional Chinese culture that, of its two major narrative forms, “it is fiction that becomes the subset and historiography the central model of narration”. Historical fiction, or history-fiction that now includes diverse modern forms, also looms large in modern Chinese culture\(^5\).

Centered on the linear narrative of the modern nation punctuated by traumatic events – which Rey Chow calls the “logic of the wound”\(^6\) – modern Chinese history is produced as “speaking bitterness” (suku 訴苦). It is one half of the yin-yang (陰陽) dualism that Plaks claims structures Chinese history-fiction.\(^7\) In modern history, “remembering [past] bitterness” (yiku 念苦) is balanced by “appreciating [present] sweetness” (sītān 思甜) in the ritual formula yiku sitān. Thus “the logic of the wound” requires a wound, a diagnosis and a remedy in the grand sweep of historical narratives.

This logic is communicated through the mass media to the people who, however defined, now constitute the fictitious foundation of the Chinese nation. As Plaks notes, the act of communication (which he calls “transmis-
sion” or chuan/zhuan (傳) is the main function of traditional history and fiction. This function is still linguistically embedded in the modern Chinese term for propaganda and publicity, xuanchuan (宣傳) and in terms for a range of narrative forms which blur history and fiction. The communicative function is also theoretically central to modern Chinese culture through the May Fourth insistence on vernacular literature, through the Marxist insistence on “popularization”, and through commercial mass media practices that, even in the People’s Republic, are increasingly capitalist and market-oriented. Theoretically, then, the collective memory of “the logic of the wound” that shapes national identity over time ostensibly resides with the people, even though elites may control the media and manipulate the message to integrate present political thought with a reconstructed past. Thus, history-fiction continues to produce popular discourses where history is told, re-told and contested in modern China.

Our case studies from the mass media cast the net wide across Chinese-speaking territories last century: mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The case studies are film versions of the Opium War as national wound; “remembering bitterness and appreciating sweetness” in media representations of Jiang Qing (江青) on trial; and counter-history/counter-narrative of The February 28th Incident in the Taiwanese film, City of Sadness. Each section includes an account of the official version[s], as well as representations of the event in the media. The narration involves more than the making of cultural memory. Jiwei Ci, for instance, describes the Chinese Marxist revolution as both “the invention and loss of meaning” through a “forced crowding of Chinese memory” with prescribed versions of history. For Ci, official history is itself an authoritative form of history-fiction that regulates memory as we see in the four films on the Opium War. Thus, the making of cultural memory necessarily involves “forced forgetting” that is at once

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8 Plaks 1997: 312.
9 Traditional and modern examples are official historiography in biographical form (jizhuanti), historical biography (zhuan), unauthorized or fictional biography (waizhuang or, ironically in A Q zhengzhuan translated as The True Story of A Q by Lu Xun), tales of marvels (chuanqi) and the historical novel (Shuihu zhuan or Water Margin). Also see Plaks 1997: 318-319.
10 Ci 1994: 15-16, 82.
cognitive and affective and “forced silence — a silence not of amnesia but a silence in spite of memory”.11

*Narrating the Wound: Four Opium Wars*

In the twenty-second year of the Qing Dynasty Daoguang (道光) Emperor’s reign (1842) declared war because Lin Zexu (林则徐) had burned twenty thousand crates of opium in Guangdong. They attacked all ports, forcing the Chinese government to sign the Treaty of Nanjing. This was the biggest national disgrace in Chinese history.

Opening title, *Eternal Fame* (萬事流芳), 1943

The Opium War was an incident that brought terrible disgrace to the entire Chinese nation and a watershed in Chinese history, because this war inaugurated China’s long century of humiliation.

Chen Da (陳達), 199712

The rise of the nation state prompts a shift in historiography from narrative forms such as the cyclical and organic model of dynastic histories13 towards a linear and progressive narrative that often correlates the origins of the nation-state to the experience of a trauma. Non-Chinese examples of this kind of “speaking bitterness” range from the anchoring of the modern Zionist narrative in something as distant as the flight from Egypt to traumatic experiences as recent as awareness of German defeat in World War I to the rise of Nazism. The similarities between the two quotes heading this section show how the Opium War has been narrated for some time now as the paradigm experience of a wound to the Chinese national body, precipitating the drive to modernity and nationalism. They produce the Opium War not as one distant border skirmish amongst others being handled by a dynasty but as a humiliation felt by a national “people” whose sense of shared identity it simultaneously produces.

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11 Ci 1994: 77.
13 Maureen Robertson 1983 discusses these pre-modern patterns.
Although these statements suggest a common understanding and experience of the Opium War, different state formations require different tellings of historical events at different times, according to their current needs. In this section, we highlight variations even within official historiography by looking at the different films that have been made about the Opium War.

Four film versions of the Opium War

Four different film versions of the Opium War speak bitterness against Western imperialism in China. The earliest is Eternal Fame, made in Shanghai in 1943, during the Japanese occupation. The second was the best known internationally until recently. Directed in 1959 by Zheng Junli and Cen Fan, Lin Zexu and The Opium War (Lin Zexu) was the approved People’s Republic version of the narrative until 1997, when Xie Jin made another The Opium War to mark the handover of Hong Kong. In between them came a Taiwanese-language film called The Opium War (Yapian Zhangzheng), directed by Li Quanxi (李泉溪) in Taiwan in 1963, the third version of the film. All four film narratives follow the logic of the national wound. Opium is shown to have deleterious effects on Chinese people, which are pronounced by key characters to be a national problem. Lin Zexu’s efforts to ban opium and his seizure and destruction of crates of the English merchants’ goods, leading to the war, are also shown in all the films. However, there are significant variations.

The earliest example, Eternal fame, is particularly interesting because it was produced during the Japanese occupation. At first sight, it might seem odd that an occupying regime would endorse a Chinese nationalist story. However, as the writer of the official People’s Republic account of pre-1949 film history Cheng Jihua (程季华) and his colleagues are quick to note, the Japanese government was actively promoting a pan-Asianist rhetoric of common resistance to Western imperialism, and so the behavior of the English in the Opium War would make it suitable for such purposes.\(^{14}\) It is not surprising, then, to discover that the film features racist representations of the English, played by Chinese actors wearing exaggerated nose prostheses and curly wigs.

\(^{14}\) Cheng Jihua et.al. 1963 vol.2: 117.
Existing scholarship on the event tends to concentrate on the intractable issue of whether or not the Chinese filmmakers involved in the production should be considered as traitors, or whether they acted to minimize the propaganda appeal of the film.\(^{15}\) This is of no relevance here. However, what distinguishes *Eternal Flame* from the other Opium War films is a sub-plot about a young girl who sells candies in the opium den run by the British merchants. She reveals that opium addiction ruined her family and sings of its dangers, leading to an altercation with the merchants. A Chinese addict and former friend of Lin Zexu intervenes. They are both thrown out, but then she helps him to overcome his addiction to opium and they fall in love and marry. What makes this more than a romantic digression is the fact that the girl is played by Li Xianglan (李香蘭). Also known as Ri Koran, Li was the main star of the Japanese-owned Man’ei Manchurian film company established in Changchun after the seizure of that territory from China. The political symbolism of Li saving the addicted Chinese man and restoring him to health is clear. In her Man’ei (滿映) films, Li usually played young Chinese girls rescued by fine Japanese officers who she then falls in love with.\(^{16}\) Here, the roles are reversed, with Li carrying a Japanese connotation. This is particularly ironic; at the end of the war it became known that although she had been promoted as a genuine Chinese star eager to help Sino-Japanese relations, Li was actually ethnically Japanese.\(^{17}\)

Another subplot in *Eternal Flame* features the resistance to the British of ordinary villagers in the area close to what is now Hong Kong. Unsurprisingly, this element is emphasized even more strongly in the 1959 People’s Republic

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\(^{15}\) Cheng dismisses the film and all associated with it. Essays written to coincide with a special tribute to actress Li Xianglan held at the Hong Kong Film Festival in 1992 are more sympathetic. Koo Siusun 1992: 23, argues that the very box office success of the film suggests it did not function as Japanese propaganda, for otherwise audiences would have stayed away. Yu Mowan 1992: 19, 21, agrees with Cheng Jihua’s assessment of Japanese motivations, adding that the film was hypocritical as the Japanese were selling opium themselves at this time. However, he notes that he disagrees with Cheng because he feels the Chinese filmmakers working at this time were not traitors, even though the companies they worked for may have been. Japanese film historian Sato Tadao 1982, argues that the Japanese official in charge of Shanghai cinema Kawakita Nagamasu was pro-Chinese, protected Chinese filmmakers, and encouraged the production of films with little propaganda value.

\(^{16}\) On Li’s Man’ei roles, see Freiberg 1996 and Yomoto 1992.

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film, Lin Zexu and the Opium War. In accordance with the requirements of a class analysis of Chinese history, the majority of the ruling class is shown as corrupt and devoid of any patriotic sense. Where other films make Commissioner Lin a lone hero, in this film he has to share the spotlight with the laobaixing (老百姓), the ordinary people, who almost seem to have an instinct for what is right. Indeed, Lin himself is shown to learn from the people on his arrival in Guangzhou, when a local fisherwoman pilots his boat past the British merchant quarters and recounts their evil behavior. Later on, when one merchant tries to escape disguised as a Chinese after Lin has laid siege to their quarters, the same woman’s husband spots him and tries to stop him. After the foreigner knocks the husband out, the wife calls the alarm. Holding up her half of heaven, she pursues the fleeing foreigner and catches him, to the accompaniment of rousing music. The cinematic rendering of these scenes echoes the depiction of more contemporary class struggle in other films. When the fisherwoman catches the foreigner, she towers above him. The camera looks down at him from her point of view as he cowers in a dark corner and claims the privilege of being a foreigner. Cut to a shot from his point of view of her shining face above him as she replies, “I know you are a foreigner,” and smacks him across the face. The camera cuts again to look down at him as he tries claiming, “I’m Chinese.” Another reverse shot and she smacks him again. In a film with a contemporary setting, this could easily be a scene between a peasant and a landlord.

The distinctive element of Li Quanxi’s 1963 Taiwanese film, The Opium War, is not to be found in the plot. The film narrates a modern and national Chinese consciousness by showing the suffering and struggles of ordinary and patriotic Chinese in the face of imperialism and corrupt feudal dynastic officials. However, unlike the other films, this version is in the Taiwanese local version of the Minnanhua (閩南話) language of Fujian Province, to where most of the longstanding inhabitants of the island trace their origins. The film was produced after the first great wave of Taiwanese-language cinema, which began with the production of the local gezaixi (歌仔戏) opera Xue Pinggui and Wang Baohuan (薛平贵与王宝钏) by a privately owned company in 1952.18 Whereas most of those films were recordings of local operas, usually made with low budgets by relatively untrained filmmakers, Li’s film is

a large-scale historical epic.\textsuperscript{19} In the market conditions of the time, this indicates strong possibility of government support. This was also when the Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) regime was trying to emphasize Taiwan’s unity with the rest of China, despite fifty years of Japanese colonial occupation. In the cinema, unity required a growing emphasis on Mandarin language but here the use of Taiwanese seems to indicate that the film was aimed at the very audiences that might have had least awareness of Chinese history in an attempt to overcome the heritage of colonialism and make them feel a common link with other Chinese.

Finally, Xie Jin’s \textit{The Opium Wars} was clearly made to celebrate the handover of Hong Kong from Britain to the People’s Republic in 1997. Perhaps because the government of the People’s Republic is now eager to promote links with previously despised overseas Chinese plutocrats or because so many members of the People’s Republic government are plutocrats themselves these days, overtones of class struggle and learning from the common people so prominent in \textit{Lin Zexu and the Opium War} are entirely absent. Instead, the film resonates with present day debates around free trade. At the end of one scene, Lin Zexu is seen announcing his demand that the British give up the opium trade. Much as the current Chinese government emphasizes the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and respect for each country’s laws, Lin notes that the British should respect the laws of the Qing Empire within its boundaries. Since the Emperor has declared dealing in opium to be illegal, this means they should quit their trade. The film promptly cuts to a meeting of the merchants, at which their leader insists that his trade will not be constrained.

It is commonly said that the appeal of historical epics lies in their ability to “bring history to life.” No doubt this is true; in the case of historical events no one actually remembers the mimetic qualities of film that may enable the memory of a movie to function somewhat like the memory of an experience. However, it is the function of all dramatic narratives to “bring things to life.” Opera, oral story telling, and historical novels also bring history to life for audiences, listeners and readers. What does differentiate film from live performances or low-cost, low technology media is its particular susceptibility to

\textsuperscript{19} However, this did not slow Li’s directorial pace; he produced eleven other films that year. Chen Feibao 2000: 389.
state control. High costs, the use of complex machinery that only well-trained people can operate, the scale of production and the special conditions required to exhibit a film all contribute to this. Furthermore, once finished, a film is not subject to the variations of live performance. The combination of “bringing things to life” and easy control makes film particularly appealing to state formations in their efforts to disseminate the kind of historical narratives that help to mobilize the support of the population they govern by promoting a sense of shared national identity through shared history.

*Bitter-Sweet: Jiang Qing on Trial*

The ten principal members of the counter-revolutionary Lin Biao (林彪) and Jiang Qing cliques were publicly tried according to the law.\(^{20}\)

Resolution on CPC History, 1981

Jiang Qing is “malevolent as a demon, treacherous as a serpent, savage as a mad dog”.\(^{21}\)

Chinese media descriptions of Jiang Qing, reported in the Western press.

Jiang Qing on trial was a nation-wide media event directed by the Party. She was pre-cast as the main scapegoat for the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), by then rewritten and generally accepted as an aberrant wound in Chinese history. Jiang Qing especially embodied the violence of this period as witness after witness in the trial relived “past bitterness”. To contain any popular backlash, the media at this time maintained a forced silence on her husband, Chairman Mao, who initiated the violence but whose political writings remain the foundation of revolutionary history and of the national Constitution. In revised Party history, the newly constituted Party under Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) claimed credit for exorcizing the wound, ending class struggle, and reasserting law and order. This history is narrated as past bitterness and

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present sweetness (yiku sitian), using old media while also adapting the formula to television that soon became the foremost mass medium in China.

**Yiku: Remembering Bitterness**

Hua Junwu (華君武), one of China’s foremost cartoonists, depicts Jiang Qing in the dock above the caption, “the old lady ascends the throne”. The cartoon renames Jiang Qing’s courtroom cage a “throne”, both recalling and ridiculing her ambition to be Mao’s heiress and red empress of China. It is a narrative. In another cartoon, Hua ironically captures her public “prominence” in the trial of the “Lin Biao-Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques” in 1980 and 1981, again recalling her long history as an actress and her former prominence as Mao’s handmaiden in the arts. So while the indictment and trial were collective, the charges, verdicts and imagery were often individual. Jiang Qing was the “evil star” of the show.22

The trial was a sensational media event, publicized through newspapers, posters, official releases, photos, cartoons, documentaries, and later in official and unofficial histories, including a spate of memoirs. But it was televised excerpts that riveted the nation. Indeed, these short excerpts were China’s first major TV politico-drama in the post-Mao period, relayed through a national network completed at the beginning of 1980. At this time, the estimated audience was only 210 million because of the limited ownership of television sets, especially in the countryside.23 But this number increased dramatically as “large crowds gathered around the few community television sets” or in the homes of friends during the trial.24 Thus the trial became a collective entertainment, especially in the cities, as the daily courtroom drama unfolded before viewers’ eyes. It was also a propaganda coup, publicizing the Gang of Four’s crimes, introducing socialist law, and transforming courtroom protocols into the shared experience of a mass trial and sentencing rally, designed to “frighten the criminal, encourage healthy trends, give publicity to

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24 Harris 1981: 41.
the legal system and educate the masses”. The trial’s impact led two later commentators to call it “77 days that shook the world”.26

The trial was nevertheless scripted history-fiction, controlled by the Party’s new elite.27 Politburo members allegedly selected and edited short excerpts for the television news, which was always pre-taped. Most of the trial was not televised, including Jiang Qing’s long defense that she acted on Mao’s instructions. Even so, the characters did not always act out the script. Zhang Chunqiao 张春桥 remained obstinately silent throughout. Jiang Qing never confessed. She argued with judges and witnesses and she ridiculed proceedings, claiming that “I was Mao’s dog; what he said to bite, I bit”.28 Most Chinese agreed with her; she was Mao’s dog.29 To the end she remained defiant. Jiang Qing’s Chinese biographer writes that “the people rejoiced, their hearts sated [over Jiang Qing’s commuted death sentence]”.30 Others document a more mixed reception, including admiration.31

The television excerpts were news items. All media were state-run and news commentary assumed the Gang’s guilt. Indeed, public opinion was bombarded with this message since the Gang’s arrest when the four were airbrushed out of official photos. The goal was to overturn official memory of the Cultural Revolution as “a great political revolution”.32 Between 1976 and 1981, there was a state-run media campaign, a nationwide “wound literature”, a de-Maoification campaign, the trial as a “formal finale”33, and a definitive Party history on the years 1949 to 1981. Official history was dry and dull. The mass media was spicy and alive. In these years, for instance, cartoonists joyously depicted Jiang Qing as a prostitute, an empress, a fox, a rat, a hen, a traitor, a smoking serpent, and a white-bone demon. These

26 Tu and Xiao 1994.
28 Terrill 1984: 19.
30 Ye 1993: 577.
31 Sang Ye 2001 remarked that at the time it was really only Westerners who supported Jiang Qing. Sec, for example, the report in Terrill 1984: 391 and Bonavia 1981a: 36-37.
33 Fei 1981: 11.
visual texts mirrored official trial strategy to come, “to make war on Jiang Qing” while suppressing any suggestion of Mao’s criminal complicity in her “Gang’s” behavior. By 1980, the media had divorced Jiang from Mao at all levels. Jiang Qing and Mao: black and red, evil wife and erring husband, demon and icon, counter-revolutionary and great revolutionary, crime and mistake, presence and absence. Jiang Qing’s strong but not-televised defense elicited an official response on Mao on 27 December 1980 that previewed Party history: Mao was “a great [albeit diminished] proletarian revolutionary” who nevertheless made mistakes in his later years. The major mistake was China’s recent wound, the Cultural Revolution.

The trial of Jiang Qing and nine others publicized this wound as spectacle-attraction, borrowing a politics of representation previously reserved for narrating the violence of the old order before the Party “saved” China. This narrative device was now turned on the accused in the courtroom with the same viciousness that they had previously used against re-instated Party leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping. The courtroom became a theatre of catharsis and revenge. It staged scenes of past suffering, privileging affective memory through personal testimony. Speaking bitterness is elevated to “history speaking itself”. David Bonavia describes the trial as trauma and emotion: “tears, cries of rage and hatred, fear, regret, spiritual surrender and utter defiance”. Even the sentencing judge recalls the “feeling of comic opera and celebration” that pervaded the courtroom when Jiang Qing, sentenced to death, shouted Maoist slogans. Television dramatized these emotions by relying on the presence of the real political actors, “spectacularizing” their real bodies in pain and anguish to give “truth” to the narrative.

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34 Tu and Xiao 1994: 127.
36 Anagnost 1997: 19.
38 Wu 1986: 326.
Sitian: Present sweetness narrates speaking bitterness as in the past

Chinese and the world generally accept the Cultural Revolution as a historical wound. As Plaks remarks on traditional history-fiction, events are always just “one half of the picture”. He claims that traditional narratives exhibit a “non-dialectical dualism” where events are represented within an overall “hypothetical order and balance” that impose a moral order.\(^{40}\) In modern Chinese history-fiction, “present sweetness” is balanced by “speaking past bitterness”. The trial’s narrative is underpinned throughout by an insistence on order: a “re-establishment” of the correct Marxist line\(^{41}\), and a re-assertion of order over chaos, of law over violence, and of justice over persecution. Revised history in the trial becomes a correct[ed], not counter, visual narrative. The courtroom is a forbidding symbol of the new order, framing the visual presentation, formalizing the speech, and so repressing the violence that threatens to overwhelm it. Thus, when the court erupted on 12 December as Jiang Qing called the judges the real “criminals” and the witnesses “renegades and rotten eggs”, she was forcibly silenced, restrained and marched out of court.\(^{42}\) This scene was televised. Jiwei Ci argues that such constant revisions, especially of recent history, “take away belief, leaving memory nothing to rest on”.\(^{43}\) The mnemonic power of this history-fiction, however, lies in the reclamation of social order as a diachronic narrative that contains the chaos and so confers legitimacy on rulers. Late Maoism signifies disorder (\textit{tianxia daluan} 天下大亂), the new regime under Deng signifies the restoration of order and reasserts a fictitious linearity to disrupted revolutionary history. This dualism extends to other mass media representations. Story after story, and picture after picture, particularize the chaos and localize the wound. At the same time, the accused are caged in the courtroom, imprisoned in reality, selectively shown onscreen, and narrated as villains of the past.

\(^{40}\) Plaks 1997: 316.
\(^{43}\) Ci 1994: 88-89.
Speaking bitterness requires an enemy. Present sweetness requires a defeat. Jiang Qing is always represented as the gendered embodiment of defeated chaos. Again, cultural memory – and cartoonists – had recourse to a silenced, but not forgotten, legacy of evil women who bring disorder to family and state: traitorous wives, evil empresses, scheming concubines and a gallery of monsters, fox-fairies and man-eating demons. The public rejoiced so jubilantly in these images of Jiang Qing that we must assume she was always widely disliked. These images were not counter-memory, then, but revealed memory. They clearly struck a mnemonic chord, visually humiliating her, demonizing her, realizing her as “dogshit spurned by mankind”. Jiang Qing’s court-room defiance inscribed this image on popular memory and in the official judgement which reprimanded her for “disrupting the order of the court”. She was led away, forgotten in the media and by the public for a decade. There was little response when she committed suicide in 1991. While the official release on her death repeated her criminal guilt, popular memory recalls only her media caricature as “a curiosity from the past”. There is no counter-narrative.

Conversely, Mao Zedong became a cult figure. Despite an official but partial forced forgetting, he is variously remembered as tyrant, god, and hero. His “posthumous cult” from the late 1980s is well-documented. Geremie Barmé ascribes the Maocraze to “a deep dissatisfaction with the status quo and a yearning for the moral power and leadership of the long-dead Chairman”. The cult is therefore a counter-narrative to the official Party version and to Deng’s China after the June 4 Tian’anmen massacre, also represented as “turmoil” in the media. The Mao cult is grassroots memory but too dispersed to displace official versions in a censored media.

Mao nevertheless bestrides history and popular memory like a colossus. But the memory, even when depicted as pop art, is ambiguous. A calendar

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45 “Court Judgement”, in Fei 1981: 129.
46 Barmé 1996.
47 Barmé 1996: 3.
48 See the semi-official version, Chen Muqi 1990.
produced for Mao’s centenary is called Remember Mao Zedong and be Grateful to Deng Xiaoping 1994-1995. The title plays with the official historical practice of *yiku sitian*: recalling the bitterness of the past to feel grateful for the sweetness of the present.⁴⁹ In official history, the debt is owed to the Party, China’s saviour. In revised official history, the Deng leadership in turn saved the Party. In the calendar, the debt is unclear. For the months of May-June 1994 a young, sexy and enigmatic Mao dominates a landscape inscribed with “show-\*\*\*\*\*\*
ering misery through the land”, a line from Mao’s poem, *The Warlords Clash* (1929). Diminutive collage figures of Jiang Qing, Lin Biao and Chiang Kai-shek dot the background as modern warlords who visit misery on the people. Is Mao included? Sun Jin’s commentary does not say. Sun ends with an observation on historical memory: “[w]hen history invades everyday life, perspective transforms some people into part of the mottled wallpaper of existence”. ⁵⁰ Perspective foregrounds Mao and backgrounds, but usually erases, Jiang Qing.

*Counter-History beyond the Nation-State: City of Sadness*

The examples we have discussed so far demonstrate how twentieth century Chinese historiography has responded to the challenge of the national by seizing the opportunity of the mass media to produce narratives that speak bitterness to encourage a sense of being part of the national “people.” Although the multiplicity and variability of these narratives certainly demonstrate their instability and contingency, all the examples we have given so far have been of official historiography, demonstrating the particular susceptibility of mass media to control by the agencies and institutions of the nation-state. However, this is not to say that there are no examples of Chinese mass media counter-histories. They have been particularly prevalent since the winding back of the state in both the People’s Republic and the Republic of China since the 1980s.

⁴⁹ Ci 1994: 82.
In this section, we investigate speaking bitterness as counter-history through Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s (Hou Xiaoxian 侯孝賢) 1989 film *City of Sadness* (*Beiqing Chengshi* 悲情城市). This three-hour epic returns to a collective Taiwanese trauma, public discussion of which was highly limited by the Kuomintang (*Guomindang* 国民党) government prior to the end of martial law just before the release of Hou’s film. This is the so-called February 28 Incident. Following the recovery of the island from fifty years of Japanese colonial occupation in 1945, the Kuomintang regime had encountered a series of practical difficulties similar to the well-known post-war corruption and economic dislocation that destroyed their reputation on the mainland. On Taiwan, this was exacerbated by mutual misunderstandings between the new regime and its new subjects; as characters point out in one scene in the film, the locals did not understand the Mandarin Chinese of the officials and the officials did not understand the Hokkienese-derived language spoken by the inhabitants of the island. The resulting tensions boiled over following a dispute involving soldiers and a woman selling smuggled cigarettes. When islanders demonstrated against the regime, the regime responded by brutally suppressing the “insurrection”, killing thousands, relentlessly pursuing all involved, and then blocking public memory of the event.

Recovering the memory of this trauma clearly has the potential to be narrated as a wound in an alternative national historiographical project; the origins of modern Taiwanese national consciousness and, depending on future events, the birth of a Taiwanese nation-state. Given the Kuomintang’s long insistence that Taiwan was an integral part of China and refusal to countenance any separate identity, as well as its political dependence on the meager territory of the island, perhaps it is not surprising that the Kuomintang seems to have felt this was not a wound that could be tamed and incorporated into its national history but rather an event that had to be actively forgotten.

However, what is intriguing about *City of Sadness* is the way in which it at once speaks the bitterness of the memories but does not articulate them clearly into the logic of a Taiwanese national wound. Although the film was

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51 The reorientation and democratization of Taiwan since the late 1980s has changed this. What was New Park near the Presidential Palace has been renamed Peace Park is home to a memorial to the victims of the February 28 Incident.
an enormous box office hit in its year of release, critics expressed frustration about its “failure” to clearly and explicitly narrate a Taiwanese nationalist perspective. How does this occur? Certain properties of the film resist appropriation into either a nation-state or proto-nation-state perspective. Instead of constructing “the people” and “the nation” as homologous, the film makes the connection between them tenuous; in *City of Sadness* the politics of nation-states involve the people, intrude upon their lives, organize them, and destroy them, but cannot be attributed to them in the manner of linear, progressive national history that narrates the people as its agents.

The people of the film are literally located at a distance from the nation-state. The film is centered on a family in the town of Chiufen (Jiufen 九份) located in the hills about Keelung (Jilong 基隆), north of Taipei. Although the central characters in the film are deeply affected by the events that follow the February 28 Incident, those events are never shown directly on the screen. We never see either the characters or the participants’ perspective on the incident; they would be inclined to place it in a national perspective, whether a Kuomintang understanding of the event as rebellion or that of the local Taiwanese leaders of the uprising, who might have been more likely to see it as the beginnings of their national consciousness.

By recovering the memory of the trauma at a distance from its epicenter, Hou’s film takes the position of those to whom national history happens rather than those who make themselves the agents of national history. This is not to say that the characters in his film are unaffected by national history. Indeed, one could say that in one way or another, all four brothers in the Chiufen family at the centre of the film are destroyed by national history. Before the film even begins, two have been victims of another national history altogether; they have been conscripted into the Japanese imperial forces, as many Taiwanese men were. One never returns from the war, the other comes back mad. The eldest brother can be seen as a victim of the corruption unleashed on the island by the arrival of the Kuomintang, as it is his inability to avoid being drawn into dealings with Shanghai gangsters to maintain his business that leads to his stabbing to death. The fourth brother, who is in many ways the main character of the film, survives until the very end, when

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52 See, for example, Liao 1993.
we learn from a poignant letter narrated on the soundtrack over a family photo of him, his wife and their baby boy that he has been arrested for suspected involvement in the February 28 Incident, presumably never to return.

These representational elements of the film are extended by Hou’s unusual cinematic language. This quality of his films has been much remarked upon, with some writers comparing his style to that of the Japanese directors Ozu Yasujiro (小津安二郎) and Mizoguchi Kenji (溝口健二). Hou’s measured and regular style that operates almost autonomously from the characters and plot may be reminiscent of what Bordwell has called Ozu’s parametric narration.\(^53\) His favoring of long shot, long take aesthetics may also recall Mizoguchi.\(^54\) However, as Nornes and Yueh have pointed out such similarities are superficial; beyond certain points of commonality, Hou’s films have their own linguistic system.\(^55\)

In the case of *City of Sadness*, the camera takes up a perspective that, while not physically that of the fourth brother and his wife, nonetheless metaphorically communicates his position. The fourth brother is deaf and mute, and makes his living as a photographer. For communication, he is dependent on his wife, who writes notes to him. Their disconnection from the fevered politics of the day is conveyed to the spectator in a scene where the wife’s brother and his friends come to visit. They engage in an energetic discussion of the politics of the day. The camera maintains the animated debaters in the center of the screen for a long time. But then, at a moment when the spectator may have forgotten about fourth brother or his inability to understand what is being said, the camera pans slowly over to where he is sitting with his wife, to one side of the main group. The conversation fades away on the soundtrack as we watch them engage in their own conversation through an exchange of notes, and those notes appear on the screen in the manner of intertitles, drawing us away from the world of public politics and into their space.

\(^53\) Bordwell 1988: 120-142.
\(^54\) Kirihara 1992: 125-129. Kirihara is careful to modulate any simple assertion that Mizoguchi only relies on long shots.
\(^55\) Nornes and Yeh 1994.
This distanced perspective is also maintained in various scenes of conflict and violence between characters, usually connected to the sectarian disputes of various kinds. For instance, in one notorious scene, a knife attack occurs by the side of a road amongst high grasses. Rather than cutting into the exchange and taking up the positions of the combatants, cutting back and forth between them, as would be a conventional way of handling such a scene and one that would position the spectator with the combatants, the camera maintains an extreme long shot distance from the events, uninfluenced by them. Writing about *The Puppetmaster* (戲夢人生), the second film in the historical trilogy started with *City of Sadness*, Nick Browne notes that the narrative episodes of the film are punctuated by shots of empty landscape. In *City of Sadness*, narrative episodes are broken up with shots over the rolling hills, taken from the heights where Chiufen (Jiufen) is situated. Browne sees these shots as echoing the aesthetics of Chinese landscape painting, with its use of empty spaces and its decentering of human affairs within the larger picture, and the non-humanist cosmology that underlies these aesthetics. Elsewhere, writing about similar aesthetics at work in Chen Kaige’s (陳凱歌) *Yellow Earth* (黃土地), Esther Yau has made similar observations. However, Rey Chow has resisted any interpretation of this as a “preservation” of “tradition” through the cinema, insisting instead that the very use of the cinema and the cinematic rendering of such aesthetics and cosmology must be understood as a specifically modern and syncretic form. In these circumstances, rather than seeing the counter-history of *City of Sadness* as a retreat from the modern and the national and a return to some sort of “tradition”, perhaps we can understand this film as speaking the bitter experience of modernity and pointing towards a future where the cosmology of the modern and the nation-state is no longer taken for granted.

*Conclusion*

“Speaking bitterness” as national memory of the wound is a feature of modern Chinese history writing that also structures history-fiction. As Anagnost

56 Browne 1996.
57 Yau 1991.
58 Chow 1990.
claims, this is “mythic” history that enters “the space of the imaginary” as “moral drama”. As “multiple transmission” through the mass media, the drama is emotive, merging affective and cognitive memory across potentially vast audiences. Unlike the localized violence released in actual oral performances, the media “mediates” speaking bitterness, separating narrator and audience. The audience consumes rather than participates in the action, and so the story releases audience emotion while the medium contains it. The emotion nevertheless transforms transmission – “a one-way sending” – into communication involving “reception and response”. Speaking about past suffering becomes communicative memory.

While a modern phenomenon, speaking bitterness retains traditional elements of history-fiction. As in traditional China, history and fiction interweave, narrating an intelligible and inherently moral universe. Yet there are fundamental changes. First, the form of history and “fiction” in most cases becomes linear, progressive and future-directed, not episodic and cyclic. “Counter-histories” such as Mao memorabilia or City of Sadness, however, may reject this form partly to emphasize their distance from official history itself. Second, the primary audience is the citizenry as “people” or “masses”, not a scholarly elite. Third, history is told using mass media suited to reaching these “people”, such as cartoons, film, radio and television, none of which are literacy-dependent. Fourth, dominant historical narratives at any one time rely on media control by elites who have the capacity to block, blunt, blur or erase counter-narratives as national narratives. All these elites narrate the construction of China (and Taiwan) as a modern nation-state, characterized by a people bound by (amongst other things) a shared history and a sense of historical collective agency. That agency is often dependent on a “logic of the wound”, inscribed as cultural memory that both defines China as a nation and its motivation for future action.

60 Williams 1963: 291.  
61 Williams 1963: 291.  
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